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“Until every soul is freely permitted to investigate every book, and creed, and dogma for 
itself, the world cannot be free. Mankind will be enslaved until there is mental grandeur 
enough to allow each man to his thought and say.” –Robert Ingersoll 
Preface 
There are few things as distinctly important to humans as the ability to speak 
to others in a language that they will understand. Speech allows us to cooperate, to 
express our deepest feelings, and gives structure to how we perceive the world. This 
enormous value that speech has for us implies that there is also something of deep 
moral value in defending the ability of people to speak freely. This thesis investigates 
the moral foundations of free expression and proposes a framework for evaluating 
morally justifiable forms of censorship. I argue that the only morally justifiable form of 
censorship is the liberal model of censorship which restricts the censorship of speech 
in all cases except where censorship is necessary to defend the autonomy of others 
from unjustified interference. 
 The most famous defense of the liberal model of free expression against most 
forms of government censorship was the book On Liberty by John Stuart Mill.1 He 
argued that the government should refrain from censorship except in cases of harm to 
others in order to defend individual freedom and preserve the pursuit of truth. Mill’s 
argument against censorship was ultimately based in his belief that a liberal society 
would lead to the most social utility on balance and that individuals have the moral 
obligation to maximize utility. Therefore, free expression for Mill is contingently 
defended so long as it is demonstrated that it actually promotes more utility. The 
deluge of offensive speech, hate speech, misinformation, and blatantly false speech 
                                                          
1 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, ed. David Bromwich and George Kateb (Yale University Press, 2003). 
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that has entered public discourse has led many people to be skeptical of the liberal 
project and whether or not it produces more social benefits on balance. Additionally, 
Mill’s claim that speech can be regulated in cases where it causes harm to others 
needs more elaboration. After all, telling people certain true things can harm them in 
some cases and certain kinds of ultimately helpful criticism can cause pain. There 
needs to be a clearer articulation of the specific circumstances where the government 
is morally permitted to intervene and censor speech on the basis of harm. Thus, Mill’s 
defense of free expression, while brilliant, has two major shortcomings because it 
defends speech on a contingent basis that may no longer hold in modern times and 
because it fails to offer a clear framework for which kinds of harms are enforceable 
and warrant censorship. 
 The aim of this thesis is to address these shortcomings and rest Mill’s liberal 
defense of free expression on sturdier foundations. I offer a Kantian defense of freedom 
of expression which grounds the moral value of free expression in the sovereign 
autonomy of individuals. This liberal model of free expression says that censorship is 
only morally justified to defend the equal freedom of rational agents to exercise their 
autonomy. I defend autonomy as the guiding moral value to resolve questions of 
censorship. Protecting the autonomy of others is not a contingent defense of free 
expression like Mill’s utilitarian defense is because free expression is itself an exercise 
of rational agency so it is constitutive and inherent to the value of autonomy. 
Unjustified violations of autonomy are the only kinds of harm that should fall under 
Mill’s Harm Principle and should allow the government to engage in censorship. In this 
thesis I will elaborate on what makes certain types of speech unjustified violations of 
autonomy and therefore what are the classes of cases where censorship can be 
exercised. My proposed account of the liberal model of free expression resolves the 
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issues that Mill’s argument faces because it makes it so free speech is no longer 
defended contingently and provides a more robust specification of Mill’s Harm 
Principle. Mill would not accept my modifications to his theory because he is a 
utilitarian and my account is Kantian. Nonetheless, I offer this conclusion as a more 
plausible moral theory to make the case against most forms of government censorship. 
 This investigation has three parts. The first section discusses the source of why 
rational agents have moral obligations. I advance the claim that moral obligations flow 
from the need for rational agents to deliberate and make choices in a manner that is 
intelligible so that their agency can be maintained over time. Morality is ultimately a 
system of rationality where the structure of reason imposes constraints on what 
rational agents are able to do. I argue that the structure of reason is grounded in two 
core principles. The first is the Principle of Universality which states that the objective 
state of intelligible reality must be true and universal for all rational agents. Thus, 
moral laws cannot apply just to a particular individual or culture and must instead be 
objective in character. The second principle is the Principle of Coherence which states 
that all valid principles must cohere and cannot contradict one another. These 
principles ultimately set constraints on what can be a valid principle for moral agents 
methodologically. Any morally justifiable censorship principle must meet these 
standards. 
 There are several proposed theories of censorship which fail to satisfy these 
principles of structural rationality. A hypocritical censor is someone that holds 
individuals to unequal standards and fails to act in a universally coherent manner. 
Rational agents have the duty to avoid hypocrisy because they have the duty to act 
rationally and hypocrisy is not rational. I offer censorship and lying as cases that are 
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generally wrong because they are normally hypocritical. Rational agents are normally 
committed to preserving an effective system of communication but both lying and 
censorship tend to subvert this system of communication. If someone censors 
according to a principle that is not universally coherent while practically committing 
themselves to a system of effective communication then they are engaging in a 
contradiction. This contradiction is hypocritical because the person is holding 
themselves to a different standard than they hold others. 
 The second section of this thesis considers several existing justifications for 
censorship that fall short of the requirements demanded of rational agents. These are 
censors which advance themselves as “liberal” because they do not want to promote 
widespread and extensive government censorship of speech but they also want to 
regulate speech along the lines of cultural standards, offense, hate speech, and the 
promotion of democratic discourse. However, I argue that if these principles are 
extended in a nonarbitrary way then they will be incompatible with the practical 
commitment of preserving a liberal society that protects broad expressive freedoms. 
Therefore, to meet one’s rational duties, these hypocritical censors must resolve these 
inconsistent commitments by either abandoning these censorship principles or 
commit to more consistently authoritarian censorship principles. 
 The third and final section of this thesis discusses several consistent censors 
which all meet the methodological rational requirements outlined in the first chapter. 
Nonetheless, these censors are not equal in terms of their plausibility. Adopting 
various consistent censors comes with several unpalatable implications. I argue that 
the censorship model that we should adopt is one based on a principle which meets 
the methodological rational requirements and that is the most plausible. I point to the 
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liberal, utilitarian, radical egalitarian, maximal autonomy, and truth censors all as 
viable consistent censors. However, I point out that each of these consistent censors 
are committed to foundational commitments that are in irreconcilable tension with 
each other. One cannot rationally choose to adopt more than one of these consistent 
censors. I defend the liberal censor model as the model that is both a consistent 
censor and the one that is most plausible. I conclude this thesis by arguing that this 
framework of the moral foundations of free expression commits institutional leaders to 
certain rational requirements. Institutional leaders have the responsibility to censor 
speech according to a valid moral principle and a moral principle that is plausible. The 
liberal censorship model is the only model of the ones discussed that meets both of 
these requirements. Therefore, leaders should only engage in censorship of speech 
when it is necessary to defend the autonomy of others from rights violations in order 





Chapter 1: Morality as a System of Rationality 
Introduction 
Most people consider it wrong to interfere with the speech of others in at least 
many cases. This chapter will investigate moral obligations as it relates to free 
expression by considering the source of our moral obligations more generally. I will 
begin by arguing that humans have a duty to act in ways that are consistent with 
their rational nature. Acting consistently with one’s rational nature requires that one 
acts on the basis of universally coherent principles. Therefore, our moral obligations 
must be formally structured in a way that makes our moral duties universalizable and 
coherent with our other moral principles. This formal structure of rationality explains 
why censorship is generally wrong. Most acts of censorship cannot be formulated in a 
way that can be universalized and coherent with other principles of action. 
 The chapter will then discuss the similarities between lying and censorship. 
Both of these actions are viewed as generally impermissible. However, many think that 
there can be principled justifications to explain why these acts can be morally 
permissible in certain circumstances. I will argue that the same reasons that justify 
lying in certain circumstances will also justify when censorship can be permissible. 
The chapter will conclude by defending a particular substantive thesis about lying and 
censorship which states that these types of typically impermissible behaviors are only 
permitted in defense or oneself or others from unjustified interference. I refer to this 
substantive thesis as the liberal framework which asserts that it is permissible to 
interfere with others when they unjustifiably infringe on the autonomy of others. 
Autonomy is the core value that is defended on a principled basis universally for each 
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rational agent. As autonomy is the controlling value, appealing to it avoids a rational 
contradiction. Later chapters will expand on this substantive thesis in more detail. 
 
Section I: The Source of Normative Obligations 
Humans are agents. In addition to having experiences we are also able to reflect on 
our experiences and judge them. This capacity for reflection allows us the ability to 
deliberate on different ends and pursue them based on our values. In other words, 
reflection helps us determine what we ought to do. The exercise of agency is 
fundamentally about reflecting about experiences and incorporating these reflections 
into an overall framework of an agent’s ends or values. The following argument 
outlines what I believe to be the source of rational obligations for humans: 
1. Humans are agents 
2. Agents ought to live intelligible lives 
3. Rationality is the mechanism by which one’s life and reality becomes intelligible 
4. Therefore, humans ought to be rational 
The first premise appears to me to be pretty straightforward. Agency is 
characterized by the ability to form higher order judgments. Both knowledge and 
abstract thinking requires a hierarchy of thought where someone makes judgments 
about judgements. In his essay “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” 
Harry Frankfurt explains that personhood is established through the structure of a 
person’s will which has the “capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in 
the formation of second-order desires.”2 A second order desire is a desire about one’s 
                                                          
2 Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” The Journal of Philosophy 68, no. 1 (1971): 7. 
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desires and is a demonstration of agency because it is a hierarchy of judgement about 
one’s judgments. Gary Watson offers a diverging view claiming that persons are able to 
hold values which “consist in those principles and ends which he – in a cool and non-
self-deceptive moment – articulates as definitive of the good, fulfilling, and defensible 
life”3 Once again, determining values is an exercise of agency because it involves a 
hierarchy of thought establishing a higher set of principles among a variety of possible 
ones. For the purposes of this essay we do not need to choose between these accounts 
because agency is a common thread. In both views of personhood, there is the ability 
for a human being to engage in higher order reflection about states of affairs in order 
to determine what has claims on a person in terms of what they should do. As the 
claim that humans are agents is not very controversial, I will proceed to the second 
premise. 
 The second premise is that agents ought to live intelligible lives. Richard 
Feldman argues that there “are oughts that result from one’s playing a certain role or 
having a certain position” and that oughts are predicated on good performance.4 For 
instance, if someone is a teacher then they ought to teach because being a teacher is 
predicated on the condition of a teacher teaching. Similarly, if a human being is an 
agent then they ought to act agentically, otherwise they are not engaging in good 
performance of what it means to be human. Returning to Frankfurt and Watson, a 
person is defined by either their second order desires or their values. Having either a 
second order desire or values requires a person to reflect and form judgements about 
their beliefs. If someone is not acting intelligently and reflecting and forming 
judgments about their beliefs then they are forsaking the defining element of their 
                                                          
3 Gary Watson, “Free Agency,” The Journal of Philosophy 72, no. 8 (1975): 215. 
4 Richard Feldman, “The Ethics of Belief,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60, no. 3 (2000): 676. 
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personhood. So, an intelligent being ought to live an intelligible life because an 
intelligent being is inescapably placed in a role or position which requires a certain 
kind of performance. If we are to play a role of what it means to be a person then we 
ought to play this role well. We would be incredulous of a teacher who decided they 
would maintain their position and teach poorly. Similarly, we would think that an 
intelligent being is not behaving as they ought to if they are not living an intelligible 
life.5 
 One may wonder at this point why agents are committed to living intelligible 
lives. I have claimed that the exercise of agency requires reflection and fitting one’s 
reflection into an overall hierarchy of values and ends for an agent. For example, a 
person can see weights as not simply something to lift. Rather, their reflections over 
the weights allow them to see the weights as part of an overall end the agent holds of 
becoming healthy. A planning agent sets ends and setting ends requires an agent to 
form evaluations about how to realize their long term plans. Squirrels, very young 
children, and those with severe dementia lack this reflective capacity to form long term 
values and ends and that is why we hold them to different standards of what we 
expect of them. Unified agency recommends certain forms of action which maintain 
that agency across time. If an agent’s agency is unified through a value such as health 
then a unified agent needs to pursue courses of action that maintain that unity. If an 
agent fails to live an intelligible life then they lack unified agency because unified 
agency must be bound together through intelligible patterns that reflect an agent’s 
long term values and ends. An agent who commits herself to contradictory ends will 
                                                          
5 Some might wonder if all positional roles imply an obligation to perform that role well. Should thieves steal 
because that is their positional role? Usually no. Thieves do not have this obligation unless there is the obligation 
to become a thief in the first place. One cannot escape being a rational agent like a thief can escape being a thief 
so there is a positional obligation that comes with rational agency that does not apply in other cases. 
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strain her agency because such commitments cannot be simultaneously held. Insofar 
as we view ourselves as unified agents, we have the responsibility to make our lives 
intelligible in order to maintain our agency over time.  
 The third premise in my argument is that rationality is the mechanism by 
which one’s life and reality becomes intelligible. Rationality and intelligibility are 
intimately connected because rationality unifies agency. I define a reason as a 
consideration in favor of discerning intelligible reality. I define Reason with a capital R 
as the actual state of intelligible reality. Every mechanism has to be aimed at 
furthering some end. The process of responding to reasons is a mechanism that is 
aimed as discerning Reason, or the state of intelligible reality. Intelligible reality is 
understood as objective features of the world in which humans live. The laws of 
physics, material objects, and our bodies are all features of what objectively exists. 
Our process of reasoning assists us in making determinations about the nature of the 
world as it is. When we make judgements after seeing objects fall our hand waving 
across our face we are ultimately reasoning about what is real.  
In addition to the patterns of the physical world, there is also a state of 
intelligible reality with respect to morality. My claim is that there is an objective state 
of morality, just like there is an objective state of reality with respect to material 
objects and natural laws. I define objective morality as the state of intelligible reality 
with respect to right conduct. Therefore, when we are reasoning about our moral 
obligations we are searching for considerations in favor of discerning intelligible reality 
with respect to right conduct. If morality is in fact an objective state of affairs in our 
reality then it completely aligns with Reason which is the actual state of reality. When 
we reason about morality our search for morality and Reason is one in the same. 
13 
 
 Moral obligations flow from the need for rational agents to deliberate and make 
choices in a manner that is intelligible. If life’s choices are to be made intelligible then 
there must be governing principles that are able to impose form on what we should do 
in the world. Christine Korsgaard explains that “Normative concepts exist because 
human beings have normative problems. And we have normative problems because we 
are self-conscious rational animals, capable of reflection about what we ought to 
believe and do.”6 Our normative problems arise because humans are intelligent and 
have the ability to assess our judgements relating to certain options being better than 
others. The nature of our agency means we are committed to forming judgements 
about our judgments and this requires us to stand by certain desires and values over 
others. Jose Ortega y Gasset once wrote that “To live is to find ourselves fatally obliged 
to exercise our liberty to decide what we are going to be in this world. Not for a single 
moment is our activity of decision allowed to rest. Even when in desperation we 
abandon ourselves to whatever may happen, we have decided to not decide.”7 The 
process of deliberation runs into an issue in that we are constantly searching for why 
our reasons are justified by other reasons and what in turn justifies those reasons. 
Unless there is a stopping point, our reasoning will lead to an infinite regress that 
lacks a stopping point. Korsgaard notes that “The realist move is to bring this regress 
to an end by fiat: he declares that some things are intrinsically normative.”8 Thomas 
Hill explains that deliberative agents are searching for “the ultimate ends that, for us, 
justify particular choices but themselves require no further justification.”9  
                                                          
6 Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 46. 
7 Jose Ortega Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses (W.W. Norton & Company, 1994). 
8 Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, 33. 
9 Thomas Hill, “Pains and Projects: Justifying to Oneself,” in Autonomy and Self-Respect (Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), 176. 
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The need to make one’s choices justifiable necessarily commits a deliberative 
agent to the normativity of rationality. Korsgaard states that for a realist the “notion of 
normativity or authority is an irreducible one.”10 The reason why the obligation is 
irreducible is because it is based in Reason itself. Ultimately, if deliberation yields a 
conclusion that is completely justifiable then it binds rational agents because an 
obligation of a rational agent is to follow rational dictates. Barbara Herman explains 
that “The result of deliberation is obligation. The practical necessity that is the core of 
Kant’s view of morality arrives as the agent determines which of the grounds of 
obligation present binds to duty.”11 Remember, human beings are agentic beings so 
the nature of our lives forces us to make our lives intelligible. Reason reflects the state 
of intelligible reality so we obligated to be rational out of necessity of how our being is 
constituted. Kant believes that through deliberation we bind ourselves to duty by 
determining what we have most reason to do. What we ought to do is derivative from 
what we are obligated to do and what we are obligated to do is derivative of what we 
have most reason to do. Therefore, we have a duty to be rational because rationality is 
the source of duty. 
Reason subsumes all other potential sources of normativity because with all 
other alleged sources of normativity we search out reasons for why we think that 
something is actually a source of normativity. We justify eating healthy in the name of 
health, we justify health in the name of happiness, and we even find justification in 
making ourselves happy in order to make our lives intelligible to ourselves. All 
reasoning works ultimately to terminate in a state of intelligibility for a deliberative 
agent. Self-justification through reasoning is ultimately the only intrinsic source of 
                                                          
10 Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, 30. 
11 Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment (Harvard University Press, 1993), 168. 
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normativity. It is only until we view something as reasonable will we, as rational 
agents, be able to accept it as a source of normativity for us. The only thing that can 
most closely approximate reasonability for us is reason itself so it makes sense that 
ultimately reason would be the only viable source of normativity. Thus, I believe that 
reason is the one distinct source of normativity. 
Someone may ask why we should feel obligated at all to follow reasons’ dictates. 
In other words, why should we be rational or care about acting rationally? The answer 
lies in the essence of who we are. We unavoidably have to live as rational agents and 
consequently rationality provides a governing structure for how we engage, interpret, 
and interact with the world. If we choose to live then we are making a conscious choice 
to engage, interpret, and interact with the world. This choice forces us to engage with 
the governing structure of rationality and give it credence. Rationality never loses its 
normative grip on us. As the end of rationality is Reason itself there can be no 
conflicting judgements from differing sources of normativity. In his book The 
Importance of Being Rational, Errol Lord thinks that “rationality consists in correctly 
responding to the objective normative reasons that an agent possesses.”12  There can 
only be conflicts for a rational agent in terms of differences about what are correct 
objective normative reasons in a relevant situation. Rationality as the source of 
normativity tells us to always pursue the most rational course of action and that is 
what grounds our normative obligations. Kant emphasized that “the content of the law 
comes from reason, not from anything special about you, or your reason, or even 
human reason, but from reason as such.”13 This claim is important because it grounds 
                                                          
12 Hallyard Lillehammer, “The Importance of Being Rational,” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, April 2019, 
https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/the-importance-of-being-rational/. 
13 Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, 174. 
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morality in an independent objective standard that abstracts away from a particular 
culture or individual. As morality is not particular to any individual or culture, we 
need an independent objective force that can provide the foundation of our moral 
obligations. The structure of Reason readily provides this foundation. 
An objection might be made at this point that says that there is not an objective 
character to morality. This argument says that morality can be particular instead of 
objective and relate completely to either an individual or culture. This approach is 
flawed because it is contrary to basic principles of reasoning. Every culture and 
individual is committed to rational coherence when it comes to physics and 
mathematics. We do not accept John’s claim that 2+2=5 are “his mathematics” and we 
have ours. All rational agents are committed to finding coherent principles of action 
that make their lives intelligible. Agents are committed to finding coherent principles 
when it comes to physics and mathematics. Coherence must also be sought when it 
comes to determining ethical principles.14 
The purpose of this section is to argue that humans have a moral obligation to 
be rational. I argued that humans are by nature agentic creatures and we have the 
ability to form judgements about our judgements and reflect on our actions and 
desires. As agentic creatures, we have obligations to make our lives intelligible. Our 
capacity for reflection makes it impossible for a rational creature to simultaneously 
hold the beliefs that X exists and X does not exist. Believing simultaneously that X 
exists and X does not exist is unintelligible and our ability to reason is what forces us 
to see that the two claims existing is unintelligible. Our rationality is the mechanism 
that makes the world intelligible because our reasoning is aimed at discerning the 
                                                          
14 The claim that ethics is relative unlike physics or mathematics will be addressed in the second chapter. 
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state of intelligible reality. Reason with a capital R reflects the actual state of 
intelligible reality and is the end state of reasoning. When agents deliberate they are 
fundamentally searching for reasons that justify themselves with reference to the 
actual state of intelligible reality. We may fail in our deliberations but the nature of 
our lives makes it so we cannot avoid deliberation. Thus, if we ought to make our lives 
intelligible and reasoning is the only way to do this then we ought to be rational. What 
we ought to do sets a framework for what we are obligated to do. Morality reflects our 
obligations. If we have the obligation to be rational then we have the moral obligation 
to be rational. The main conclusions of this section are that Reason is the source of 
normativity for rational agents and that intelligent creatures have a moral obligation to 
be rational. 
 
Section II: The Character of Reason 
 While I have argued that Reason is the source of normative moral obligation, I 
have not yet touched on what the form of Reason looks like yet. This section will lay 
out the character of Reason. I will argue that the character of Reason takes the form of 
universally coherent principles. Any source of moral obligation must conform to the 
character of Reason and this will give us insights into how we are able to frame our 
moral obligations and justifications. I will advance two principles that reflect the form 
of Reason which are derived from Kantian arguments. These principles are: 
 The Principle of Universality 




Before I dive into the principles, I want to first outline the standards of what 
constitute the requirements of Reason. Recall that Reason is defined as the state of 
intelligible reality. If a principle is to approximate intelligible reality then it must be 
accessible to all intelligent agents. Intelligent agents make reality intelligible through 
the mechanism of reason so the same use of reason for all intelligent agents needs to 
yield the same conclusion. Moreover, intelligible reality cannot be contradictory 
because anything contradictory is unintelligible. Both of the principles are aimed at 
capturing these formal constraints of Reason and these constraints set limits on how 
rational agents are able to conceive of their moral obligations. 
I will call the first principle of Reason the principle of universality. This principle 
states that any conclusion accurately reflecting the state of intelligibility must be 
universally and conclusively reached by all equally rational agents who impartially 
weigh the considerations at issue. The objective state of intelligible reality must be 
true for all rational agents. Kant points out that “as morality serves as a law for us 
only because we are rational beings, it must also hold for all rational beings.”15 For 
instance, laws of mathematics and physics are universal laws that have universal 
force in the world. Take Planck’s Constant or the Pythagorean Theorem. These laws 
reflect objective relationships in the world and are a representation of universal laws. 
Similarly, objective moral laws need to be binding on all rational agents. Kant explains 
that the principles of reason are a priori principles so they “cannot be obtained by 
abstraction from any empirical, and therefore merely contingent, knowledge.”16 He 
notes that a command of reason is an imperative and that objective principles of 
                                                          
15 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. Thomas Abbott (Digireads.com Publishing, 
2017), 51. 
16 Kant, 23. 
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reason are based in “principles which are valid for every rational being as such.”17 The 
law of gravity, Planck’s Constant, and the Pythagorean Theorem are all valid principles 
for every rational being and are constitutive principles of Reason. For a moral law to 
be a valid principle of Reason then it must be a valid principle for every rational being, 
or universal in nature. 
Kant formulates the requirement of the principle of universality through the 
Categorical Imperative. An imperative is an objective principle that is binding for 
rational agents. If morality is to have imperatives then they must be categorical and 
bind all rational agents equally. Kant says the Categorical Imperative has the 
formulation of “Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that 
it should become a universal law.”18 The Categorical Imperative is an expression of 
principle of universality because if a principle is to satisfy the formulation of the 
Categorical Imperative then it must be universally and conclusively willed by all 
rational agents who impartially weigh the considerations at issue. Terry Price notes 
that because “morality does not rest on any particular reason for action, no change in 
circumstances could undermine the authority of the categorical imperative.”19 The 
Categorical Imperative expresses a form for principles but itself has no content or 
relies on no facts on the ground. This is why Kant states that “Empirical principles are 
wholly incapable of serving as a foundation for moral laws.”20  
At this point, I am not taking a stand on any particular moral philosophy. For 
example, diverse philosophies like ethical egoism and utilitarianism can both satisfy 
                                                          
17 Kant, 25. 
18 Kant, 31. 
19 Terry Price, Leadership Ethics: An Introduction (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 52. 
20 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, 47. 
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the principle of the Categorical Imperative. The willing of the principle that all rational 
agents should promote their self-interest or all rational agents should maximize utility 
both in theory satisfy the formula of the Categorical Imperative. They express 
universal principles with respect to every rational agent. What this principle does is 
establishes a groundwork framework that any valid moral principle must meet. 
The second principle that reflects the form of Reason is the principle of coherence. 
This principle asserts that all valid principles must cohere and cannot contradict one 
another. Any state of intelligible reality cannot be contradictory because contradiction 
renders a state of affairs unintelligible. It is unintelligible for an agent to 
simultaneously believe X and not-X. Moreover, reality cannot simultaneously consist 
of X and not-X. Therefore, a valid principle of Reason is to have principles that cohere, 
there must either be X or not-X. Moral principles must be coherent in order to be 
binding on rational agents. It is unintelligible to have two moral principles that one 
“cannot kill humans” and “I can kill that human named Bob.” Both of these principles 
considered simultaneously contradict each other and are incoherent taken together.21  
The principle of coherence places a second major constraint on the form of valid 
moral principles. Established principles cannot contradict other established 
principles. Kant explains that “all maxims ought by their own legislation to harmonize 
with a possible kingdom of ends as with a kingdom of nature.”22 When a rational being 
sets reasonable ends then they must not conflict with the reasonable ends of other 
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rational agents or not conflict with any laws of nature. Kant’s kingdom of ends is 
ultimately a vision of perfect coherence between all ends of intelligible reality. 
 
Section III: Authenticity and Hypocrisy 
When the principles of universality and coherence are combined they provide a 
general framework for evaluating the validity of moral principles. Any posited moral 
principle that is not universal for all rational agents or contradicts with another moral 
principle fails to establish itself according to a rational form and should be rejected. 
These principles also limit agents morally from acting on the basis of certain principles 
that are incoherent or cannot be universalized. An implication of this conclusion is a 
duty of authenticity for rational agents. I define an authentic agent as an agent whose 
expressive behavior aligns with the agent’s beliefs. The duty to be authentic flows from 
an agent’s duty to be coherent. If an agent believes in a particular moral principle then 
they act irrationally when they act in a way that is not in accord with their beliefs, 
either their actions or beliefs are wrong. For instance, if an agent believes that stealing 
is an immoral act and then steals she is acting inauthentically because her beliefs do 
not align with her actions. Authenticity can be reestablished by either changing her 
beliefs about the permissibility of theft or changing her actions. I argue that all 
rational duties imply a duty to be authentic which flows from a rational agent’s duty to 
be coherent in both their actions and beliefs. 
The duty to be authentic explains the wrongness of hypocrisy. Jay Wallace explains 
that hypocrisy typically entails “an inconstancy in a person’s attitudes and behavior. 
People whose outward behavior does not comply with their inner convictions seem to 
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be at odds with themselves.”23 Hypocrisy is the defining act of inauthenticity because it 
reflects an incoherence between an agent’s expressed actions and beliefs. Hypocrisy 
involves attitudes of moral blame for others when the same agent is blameworthy in 
the same way. Wallace emphasizes we act objectionably as hypocrites when we blame 
others “without subjecting your own attitudes and behavior to critical assessment, 
and bringing them into harmony with your current reactions to the attitudes and 
behavior of others.”24 Wallace thinks that we act wrongly as hypocrites because we fail 
to respect the equal moral standing of others by attaching “to my interests greater 
importance than it ascribes to yours.”25 The duties of rationality require that we act 
according to maxims that we can will as universal laws. Hypocrites do not act in a 
manner that can be universalized because they apply unequal standards of blame and 
fail to treat others as moral equals. Rational agents have the duty to avoid hypocrisy 
and act according to universally coherent principles. Therefore, any valid moral theory 
cannot allow for hypocritical blame or for agents to act inauthentically.  
I will now explain why lying and censorship are generally impermissible. 
Performing these actions usually generates a rational contradiction. If a liar or censor 
commits a rational contradiction, they act hypocritically by applying unequal 
standards between themselves and others. Lying and censorship are usually wrong 
because these actions fail to respect the equal moral standing of others due to the 
application of unequal standards that prioritizes the interests of some over others on 
the basis of rationally incoherent standards. 
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Section IV: The Wrong of Lying and Censorship 
 We are now able to tie the threads of this moral theory together and use these 
framework to explain the general wrong of censorship. I will argue that censorship is 
usually wrong because the censor commits herself to a kind of practical contradiction 
which violates the standards of rationality central to any kind of morally permissible 
action. Thus, the censor generally acts impermissibly. In order to explain how this 
practical contradiction works I will appeal to the generally immoral act of lying. The 
wrongness of lying can be explained by lying generate a practical contradiction that 
commits an agent to irrational action. However, there are principles that can be 
appealed to in order to justify certain exceptions to the general rule that one ought not 
lie. I will outline these kinds of exceptions and point to similar exceptions that can be 
appealed to in order to justify certain kinds of censorship. 
Christine Korsgaard says that certain actions are contrary to our moral duties if 
they commit an agent to a practical contradiction. She explains that “If 
universalization would destroy the connection between action and purpose, the 
purpose is not a sufficient reason for the action.”26 Take the case of someone cutting in 
line. Someone cuts in line in order to gain an advantage of waiting less. However, if 
everyone cutting the line were to be universalized then the advantage someone would 
gain from the action would be frustrated; there would be no line to cut. The person 
who cuts the line makes them an exception to a general rule that people should 
organize themselves into a line. Line cutting functions as a kind of practical 
contradiction that Korsgaard explains where universalizing line cutting would break 
                                                          
26 Christine Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 102. 
24 
 
the connection between the action and its intended purpose. The agent who cuts the 
line wills two incoherent things: that there is a line and that they can cut the line. 
Rational agents need to be able to will commitments that do not undermine their other 
commitments. Rational agents are thereby limited in the actions that they are able to 
consider morally permissible actions because certain actions will result in a practical 
contradiction of will.  
 The reason why no rational agent can permissibly commit themselves to a 
practical contradiction is because it is irrational to do so. When an agent engages in a 
practical contradiction they see themselves as an exception to a rule they accept. An 
agent who commits a practical contradiction acts unintelligibly because they commit 
themselves to contradictory principles. This action threatens the unity of an agent over 
time because agency cannot be unified according to contradictory principles. An agent 
is defined by their reflective evaluations in light of values and ends the agent sets for 
themselves. However, if an agent has contradictory values or ends then this fragments 
agency. It is impossible for an agent to simultaneously commit themselves to the 
principles X and not-X. Trying to will both principles simultaneously is a practical 
contradiction and is wrong because it fragments the unity of a person’s agency. 
 Those that commit practical contradictions are hypocrites through the 
application of unequal standards. Hypocritical action is wrong because it denies the 
equal moral standing of persons. Hypocrisy is itself a practical contradiction by 
applying a standard that should be applied to all while simultaneously denying the 
application of the principle to oneself. Individuals have moral standing in light of their 
rational agency. However, if a person acts hypocritically they engage in a practical 
contradiction by violating the standards of rationality that demand acting on the basis 
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of universally coherent principles. Whenever an agent fails to interact with others on 
the basis of universally coherent principles then they undercut their own moral 
standing which is derived from their rational agency. An agent cannot simultaneously 
will that they have moral standing while denying the moral standing of others. 
Therefore, hypocritical action is wrong because it involves incoherence on the part of 
the agent and fails to treat others as though they have equal moral standing. 
 I will now outline the value of communication. The capacity to effectively 
communicate with others is crucial for an agent to realize their distinct ends, projects, 
and values. All agents need to will a world in which the value of communication is 
preserved in order to realize their ends. Lying and censorship are two actions that 
subvert the value of communication. Thus, engaging in lying and censorship is usually 
a hypocritical action that commits an agent to a practical contradiction. It 
simultaneously commits an agent to a principle that the value of communication in 
the world should be preserved while performing actions that subvert the value of 
communication. If everyone lied and censored at will then the structure of 
communication that the agent is practically committed to would collapse. Therefore, 
the liar or censor makes themselves an exception to a rule which is hypocritical and 
fails to respect the unity of their agency and treat others with equal moral standing. 
The Value of Communication 
 The effectiveness of human communication is one of the central reasons 
humans have advanced so much as a species. Communication enables collaboration 
and enables people to set plans and realize long term projects. Seana Shiffrin 
emphasizes that we need mutual access to the minds of others in order to live in 
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communities and realize our shared moral projects.27 Helping others, coordinating 
donations to charity, collaborating in mutual defense are all long term moral projects 
that are successful in virtue of effective communication. A breakdown in our ability to 
communicate threatens the preservation of some of our most fundamental moral 
values. Once again, this is not a consequentialist defense of communication, although 
these arguments certainly are strong consequentialist reasons to defend the value of 
communication. I am claiming that every agent is practically committed to the value of 
communication to realize their distinct ends and projects.28 This line of argument 
explains why every rational agent should practically commit themselves to 
maintaining an effective system of communication. 
 A shared moral community relies heavily on the notions of praise and blame. 
We praise or blame others to the extent that they succeed or fail in meeting their 
moral responsibilities. Blame is a type of sanction we apply in order to determine how 
we interact with others. As blame is a type of sanction we should be cautious about 
applying this sanction only to those who deserve it. One of reasons we do this is 
because we want to avoid the unjustified sanction of others that comes with blame. 
We do not want to be blamed when we fulfill our moral responsibilities or are 
incapable of doing so. Our determination of moral responsibility is heavily dictated by 
the mental states of the actors who engage in them. We praise the person who helps 
the poor when they do so out of concern for the welfare of others. We would blame a 
person or withhold praise if we found out a person only helped the poor to make their 
image look good and had no concern for the welfare of the poor. Many people think 
                                                          
27 Seana Shiffrin, Speech Matters: On Lying, Morality, and the Law (Princeton University Press, 2014), 13. 
28 Of course, it is possible to conceive of a person who does not practically will a world with effective 
communication. I have yet to meet such a person. 
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that moral responsibility turns on the reasons for which people perform actions and 
not simply the actions that they perform. Communication is an important window that 
we have into the mental states of others to help evaluate their reasons for action even 
if we are never able to fully know why someone acted. Likewise, an effective system of 
communication also allows us to communicate our mental states to avoid sanctions 
from unjustified blame. A breakdown in dialogue is dangerous to our moral 
community because we would lose a key source to help us determine moral 
responsibility and appropriately praise and blame others. 
 A third reason why communication is so important is that it allows individuals 
to cultivate their agency as moral thinkers. Thinking is incredibly difficult when done 
solely within the confines of one’s own mind. Effective thinking involves expressing 
one’s ideas by drawing them out into the open in order to evaluate them. Shiffrin 
explains that in order to formulate a complex world a thinker must have the “ability to 
externalize bits of one’s mind, identify them as particulars, and then evaluate them.”29 
We are unable to become good moral agents without thinking in complex ways. Insofar 
as limits on communication place limits on our ability to think in complex ways our 
moral agency is limited. Without the ability to communicate we lose the ability to 
express ourselves and imprint our identity on the world around us. 
 A fourth reason why communication is valuable is because it is a necessary 
condition to fulfill an agent’s duty of authenticity. I previously outlined how rational 
agents have a duty of authenticity that is based in coherence. I defined an authentic 
agent as someone whose expressive behavior aligns with their beliefs. If an agent is 
limited in the extent of their communication then this could infringe on their ability to 
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say what they think and believe. Preserving the ability to communicate is crucial so 
that an agent can maintain coherence between their expressive activity and their 
beliefs and meet their rational obligations. Authenticity and honest communication 
are very similar but can come apart. I defined authenticity as the state of alignment 
between an agent’s behavior and beliefs. When a person is dishonest they act 
inauthentically by intentionally create a gap between what the agent believes and how 
they represent their beliefs to others. A dishonest person behaves inauthentically but 
my definition of authenticity allows for more inauthentic behavior beyond dishonesty. 
 This is only a rough sketch of only some of the reasons why agents should 
practically will a world of effective communication. Communication is an integral part 
of our daily lives. Indeed, a human being is unlikely to have a single day in their lives 
go by without communicating in some form or fashion with others. My aim in this 
section is to establish why every person should be practically committed to preserving 
communication. This practical commitment constrains the conduct of rational 
individuals. As I previously noted, rational agents have the obligation to avoid 
practical contradictions. Our actions cannot contradict our practical aims. We cannot 
act in a manner that subverts the type of behavior that we want to will to be universal 
law. Therefore, actions that limit the extent of communication in the world are wrong 
prima facie because they compromise our practical aim to preserve the value of 
communication in the world. An implication of this is that any agent who engages in 
communication-limiting behavior has the burden of justifying their actions without 
resorting to a practical contradiction in will. Deception and censorship are generally 
wrong in that they usually unjustifiably limit our communication structure. I will now 
turn to several accounts of when deception can be justified. These contingent defenses 
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of deception will illuminate some contingent defenses of when censorship may be 
justified. 
Principled Defenses of Deception 
 Deception threatens the key values that I outlined relating to communication 
and is a prima facie wrong. First, deception can compromise the ability for people to 
communicate in order to protect their moral projects. For instance, collective self-
defense from those who wish us harm is an important moral project. However, to 
collectively defend ourselves we must rely on what others say. Deception is a wrong 
because it undermines our ability to rely on the communication of others as truthful 
which can limit our ability to engage in collective moral projects like self-defense. 
Weakening our ability to rely on the mental states of others as truthful also threatens 
our ability to hold others morally responsible. When we lose trust in the speech of 
others our ability to engage in dialogue with others and form external representations 
of the world is damaged. Finally, when we deceive others we violate a duty of 
authenticity we owe to ourselves. Deception necessarily involves a subterfuge between 
what someone expresses and what they actually believe about the world. Thus, the 
deceptive agent is an inauthentic agent. For these reasons we can conclude that 
deception is a prima facie wrong.30 
 I also believe that deception is a pro tanto wrong. What I mean by this is that 
deception is always wrong to at least some extent. I previously mentioned that 
deception involves a type of dishonesty where there is a disconnect between an agent’s 
expressive activities and their beliefs. Thus, the deceptive person is always inauthentic 
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to at least some extent. There is a loss when an agent acts inauthentically because it 
threatens the coherence of an agent’s identity. While deception is a pro tanto wrong 
that does not mean that it cannot be outweighed by other considerations. There is 
always a loss when an agent is deceptive but all things considered in certain 
circumstances it may be permissible for an agent to deceive. I will now consider a 
situation where I think it is justified all things considered to deceive. 
 While deception is a prima facie wrong, most moral theories would make a 
principled exception for lying in certain circumstances. One case is the famous 
murderer at the door where a murderer approaches you and asks you if your friend is 
inside your house. If you refuse to answer your silence will reveal your friend’s 
location. If you tell the truth then the murderer will know your friend’s location and 
proceed to murder him. The paradox of communication is that subverting most of our 
communication structures is a prima facie wrong while many moral theories would 
assert it is permissible, or even obligatory, to lie to the murderer at the door. The 
rational framework above constrains the manner in which moral theories can admit 
justifications for lying. Principled defenses of deception must be compatible with a 
universal principle that does not contradict any other moral principles. The paradox of 
communication can be resolved with a moral theory that explains why lying is wrong 
in most cases but there are cases like the murderer at the door where lying can be 
justified without committing a practical contradiction. 
Kant thought that lying was never justified. Thus, he denies there is even a 
paradox where cases of deception like the murderer is permissible. Kant went so far as 
to say that even when confronted with a murderer at your door you still have the duty 
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not to lie even to protect the intended victim.31 The reason why Kant thought you could 
not lie to the murderer at the door is because you would be engaging in a practical 
contradiction by lying. Korsgaard explains that Kant thought lying was a practical 
contradiction because the efficacy of a lie “depends upon the fact that most people do 
not engage in them, and which therefore can only be performed by someone who 
makes an exception of himself.”32 A successful lie to the murderer requires in Kant’s 
view that your lie is accepted as true. However, if everyone’s lies were accepted as true 
then the whole fabric of our communication system would break down. An agent 
cannot be simultaneously committed to the whole fabric of our communication system 
and lying in this case so there is a duty to not lie in order to avoid a practical 
contradiction. Thus, Kant thinks you have a duty to never lie, even to the murderer at 
the door. 
Kant’s approach passes the formal requirements of reasoning because he 
advances a universally coherent moral principle. Nonetheless, substantively his 
account is very unsatisfying. When evaluating a moral principle we should first make 
sure that it is formally valid and then make sure it is a principle we are willing to 
accept in terms of substance. Saying that an individual can never permissibly lie is a 
very strenuous requirement. The most damaging implication of this hard position is 
that it fails to allow for lying in defense of oneself and others. We can imagine cases 
where individuals are in a position where the use of deception is the only way to avert 
serious moral harms. If you tell the truth to the murderer at the door then an innocent 
human being will die. Moreover, if you stay silent in the face of the question of 
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whether the intended victim is in your house you indicate to the murderer where your 
friend is. Deception is the only strategy, short of physically confronting the murderer, 
to prevent an egregious moral harm. Thus, I conclude that Kant’s view should not be 
accepted substantively even if it passes formal requirements of reasoning.33  
 Christine Korsgaard deviates from Kant’s strong position and thinks an agent 
can lie to the murderer at the door without engaging in a practical contradiction. She 
contends that the lie to the murderer is not a practical contradiction because 
universalizing the lie would not destroy the efficacy of the lie.34 Korsgaard notes that 
while you know the circumstances of the situation the murderer does not know that 
you know the circumstances of the situation. He is unaware that you know he is 
intending to murder the victim. Therefore, universalizing the lie does not destroy the 
efficacy of the lie because there is an informational asymmetry between you and the 
murderer which makes it successful even when the lie is universalized. Korsgaard also 
thinks a person can permissibly lie to the murderer at the door in order to prevent 
themselves from being used as an instrument for evil.35 She argues that because the 
murderer is trying to deceive you deceptive defensive action is justified so that one 
does not become an instrument for evil ends. Thus, deception would not be generally 
permitted in Korsgaard’s view but would be permitted in contingent circumstances 
where a lie can be universalized without creating a practical contradiction and in order 
to defend oneself from being used as an instrument for evil. 
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 Christine Korsgaard’s account is better than Kant’s because it admits a 
principled basis by which an individual is able to engage in deception in self-defense. 
Her argument passes through the standards of formal reasoning because it is 
universally coherent. Korsgaard articulates a principle that can be universalized and 
does not conflict with other moral principles. I contend that any moral theory that 
does not allow for the use of deception in any circumstances to defend oneself from 
being used as an instrument for evil is unsound substantively. I think this because 
individuals are entitled as rational agents to a sphere of autonomy that others are 
unable to breach and this sphere can be defended. The weakness of Korsgaard’s view 
is that it does not allow for the use of deception in defense of others. I will now turn to 
why that is the case. I think allowing for defense of others is crucial because 
individuals have key interests in virtue of their autonomy as rational agents. We must 
recognize that others are also entitled to the same sphere of autonomy that we hold 
ourselves entitled to. Certain actions that violate the autonomy of others fail to respect 
their rights. A substantively adequate moral theory is one that allows for the defense 
of individual autonomy. 
 Tamar Schapiro takes issue with Korsgaard’s argument because it inadequately 
addresses the permissibility of using deception in defense of others. Schapiro accepts 
that Korsgaard’s analysis works for the murderer at the door but would not work in a 
situation is not using deception. Schapiro imagines a case where a Nazi approaches 
you to ask about where you are hiding fugitives and is completely honest about his 
intentions.36 Korsgaard’s view would say it is impermissible to lie to the Nazi because 
he is not trying to deceive you and is honest. Schapiro thinks deception is usually 
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wrong because it violates the autonomy of others and “amounts to a refusal to 
reciprocate within a scheme of shared thought and action.”37 Communication 
necessarily involves more than one person and successful communication requires 
certain actions be performed by each person involved. For this reason, Schapiro says 
that communication is a type of “colegislation game” with mutual obligations. She 
argues that we can permissibly deceive the murderer and Nazi at the door because 
their actions demonstrate a commitment to not respect the autonomy of others which 
erodes the foundational value of honest communication.38 
The duty of honest communication is derived from our duty to respect the 
autonomy of others. Our duties to respect the autonomy of others are based in an 
aspect of colegislation and individuals can forfeit their entitlements to have their 
autonomy respected by failing to respect the autonomy of others. Deception is usually 
wrong because it interferes with the autonomy of others and manipulates an 
individual’s understanding of the world so that they are not able to operate as an 
autonomous author of their own ends. However, when a person makes the decision to 
violate the autonomy of others they forsake entitlements they hold in virtue of their 
autonomy. Such a decision makes an individual liable to interference in direct 
proportion to the degree they threaten the autonomy of others. 
Schapiro’s account is an improvement over Korsgaard’s because it elaborates 
on a principled argument for why lying is generally wrong but we can permissibly lie to 
the murderer at the door in defense of ourselves and others. This account is focused 
on protecting individual liberty from interference. I will classify Shapiro’s explanation 
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that resolves the paradox of communication as the liberal communicative theory. This 
theory asserts that individuals have the responsibility to respect the autonomy of 
others and this can involve engaging in communication strategies that protect oneself 
and others from unjustified interference to their autonomy. The liberal communication 
theory asserts that most individuals have rights against interference against 
interference in virtue of their autonomy as rational agents. Kant argues that rational 
agents have the sovereign right to independence where no one else can claim authority 
over them when they respect the equal freedom that is granted to rational agents.39 
This right to independence grounds the right of autonomy. The theory passes through 
the standards of formal reason because it advances a universally coherent standard 
that defends a universal principle that allows for deception in defense of others. This is 
also the correct view substantively because it respects autonomy as a preeminent 
value. Agency involves the setting of ends and values and bringing our reflective 
experiences in accord with these values and ends. Autonomy crucially is a reflection of 
agency because autonomous action establishes an individual’s ends and values as 
distinctively hers. Individuals are sovereign agents and their autonomy must be 
respected otherwise the equal moral standing of individuals would be threatened.  
There is also not a practical contradiction when deception is allowed in defense 
of the autonomy of oneself or others. The foundational value of communication is that 
it promotes autonomy and allows individuals to realize their own projects and ends. 
An agent will only practically will a system of effective communication insofar as it 
contributes to the preservation of a justified autonomous sphere of action for 
individuals. An agent commits no practical contradiction by lying in defense of the 
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autonomy of oneself or others because the agent is willing the universally coherent 
means in the world to respect their autonomy. Such means will largely demand honest 
communication but will admit of certain principled exceptions. 
In this essay I am using a moralized conception of interference which is 
bounded by the entitlements others have. The liberal account does motivate the 
question of what constitutes justified interference with others and what specific 
entitlements individuals possess in terms of their autonomous sphere of action. In the 
second chapter I will review several arguments for what sphere of autonomous agency 
an agent is entitled to. Before we do that we can turn to principled defenses of 
censorship. What we shall see is that the same arguments regarding justifications of 
lying also apply to communication strategies that justify censorship. 
 
Principled Defenses of Censorship 
 In this section I contend that censorship faces the same paradox of 
communication that deception does. First, the same arguments for the value of speech 
counting as reasons to avoid deception are the same reasons that count for avoiding 
censorship and in some cases allowing it. The act of censorship interferes against the 
ability of others to communicate. As I define it, censorship differs from persuasion in 
that it does not involve changing the expression of speech through voluntary actions. 
Censorship uses force in some form to override the will of others to speak. Frustrating 
the communication of others is a prima facie wrong like deception because it threatens 
our communication structures which protect crucial values. Remember, agents 
practically will an open structure of communication because they: 
 Allow us to collectively work with others to realize our moral aims 
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 Provide us access into the minds of others to assign moral responsibility 
 Enable individuals to cultivate their autonomy and individual identity 
 Preserve the ability of agents to fulfill their duties to act authentically 
Censorship threatens all of these practical aims by limiting communication. Therefore, 
I argue that it is a prima facie wrong to censor the speech of others.  
The foregoing argument does not say it is always wrong to censor. Rather, 
censorship must be justified on a principled basis. For a principle to be rationally 
supported it must be universal and not contradict any other principles. Censorship 
has the same paradox of communication that deception encounters. Most forms of 
censorship are viewed as morally problematic. However, there are certain types of 
censorship that most moral theories would say are justified. For instance, consider 
Justice Holmes’ famous case where a man intentionally yells fire falsely in a crowded 
theater starting a panic where multiple people are seriously injured.40 Like the 
murderer at the door, most moral theories are pressed with the paradox of why most 
censorship seems unjustified but censoring the individual from intentionally causing a 
dangerous panic in a theater by falsely shouting fire is justified. I will argue that a 
plausible substantive moral theory would justify censorship of the person who 
intentionally shouts fire in a crowded theater on a principled basis. 
The utilitarian would solve this paradox in the same way they solve the 
communication paradox relating to deception. Their approach is to only censor when 
doing so maximizes utility. Censorship in general is wrong because it can promote 
dogmatic thinking, can threaten the search for truth, and erode the ability for 
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individuals to build their identity which contributes to their happiness.41 Nonetheless, 
the utilitarian would not say that all forms of censorship fail to maximize utility. The 
theater case is a case where it would maximize utility to censor a person from falsely 
shouting fire in the theater. The panic would cause serious injuries which would erode 
utility. Moreover, the utility in the speech act of the individual in speaking is very low. 
The person is intentionally shouting fire falsely in a theater with the express purpose 
of starting a panic. They are intentionally asserting known falsehoods in a moment 
where individuals are not able to carefully deliberate and respond appropriately. For 
all these reasons the utility would say censorship in the theater case is justified 
because it maximizes utility.42 
Some may adopt an approach similar to Kant’s views on deception with 
censorship and deny there is even a paradox. They would assert that censorship, like 
lying, is never justified and the person falsely shouting fire in the theater cannot be 
censored. The argument claims that there is a not a principled distinction in which a 
censor is able to avoid general censorship but censor the person in the theater case. 
Like Kant’s position with the murderer at the door, this approach seems excessively 
rigorous. Yet, it is a universally coherent approach that adheres to the rational 
principles above. Substantively, however, I will reject this theory for the same reasons 
why I reject Kant’s universal prohibition against deception because the approach does 
not allow for defense of oneself or others. 
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Others can go the route Christine Korsgaard takes with respect to censorship. 
They may argue that censorship could be narrowly universalized where an individual 
can protect themselves from being used as an instrument for evil. However, 
Korsgaard’s argument only applies in more limited cases where an individual is able to 
protect themselves from being used for evil ends. This account invokes an ideal of self-
defense but does not extend the strategic communication to defending others.43 Recall 
that Korsgaard’s argument is vulnerable in that it would allow deception to the 
murderer at the door but would not allow deception to the forthright Nazi who is not 
deceiving you but is planning on murdering others. I take issue with Korsgaard’s 
reasoning being applied to the censorship case because it fails to adequately allow for 
censoring speech in defense of others. Adopting Korsgaard’s approach would permit 
censorship if you are in the theater and censoring the intentional liar would defend 
yourself and prevent you being used as part of an evil end. However, imagine this 
case: 
Theater Defense of Others Case 
You become aware that an evil actor is about to intentionally and falsely yell fire in a 
crowded theater in order to start a panic and cause serious injury. You are not in the 
theater and would not be injured if the evil actor yelled fire. Thus, you personally are not 
being used as an instrument for evil. However, you have a big red button in front of you. 
If you press it the evil actor will be silenced against his will and be unable to carry out 
his plan. 
                                                          
43 In fact, Korsgaard’s account may not even allow for censorship in defense of oneself in the theater case. In this 
case there is no information asymmetry between you and the person shouting fire. Korsgaard’s position may have 
to commit itself to the same position as the rigorous Kantian approach would in the theater censorship case. 
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Korsgaard’s view of justified lying is troubling because it does not allow for lying 
in defense of others. Similarly, if we apply her principle justifying lying to the murderer 
at the door to the theater censorship cases it would permit censorship by someone in 
the theater but would not allow censorship on behalf of others in a different theater. 
The theater case in defense of others strikes me as a case where censorship is clearly 
justified. Any moral theory that does not justify censorship in the theater case is not a 
compelling moral theory. Therefore, substantively I do not accept Korsgaard’s 
argument as it relates to the theater defense of others case. 
Tamar Schapiro’s discussion of justifications for deception provides an 
important way to solve the paradox of communication. Remember, we are looking for a 
moral theory that explains why censorship is wrong in most cases but justifies 
censorship in certain cases on the basis of defense of oneself and others. This is what I 
will refer to as the liberal defense of free expression because it rests on individual 
autonomy. Schapiro notes that communication is a game that requires at least two 
parties in order to be successful. The value of communication is derived from respect 
parties have for the autonomy of others as rational agents.44 When a person fails to 
respect the autonomy of others then this assaults the basis of why we view censorship 
as a fundamental wrong. When the evil actor plans to intentionally yell fire in a 
crowded theater to cause a panic she is compromising the autonomy of others. We 
have a duty to usually not censor in virtue of an agent’s status as an autonomous 
rational agent. But when the evil actor seeks to violate the autonomy of other she is 
forfeiting her entitlement against certain kinds of censorship. She voluntarily decides 
                                                          
44 Schapiro, “Kantian Rigorism and Mitigating Circumstances,” 54. 
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to breach the standards of the colegislation communication game and this forfeits her 
entitlement to be respected in certain ways. 
We can see the justifications for lying to the murderer at the door neatly align 
with the same justifications for censoring speech in the theater case. Both examples 
involve a person who is infringing on the autonomy of others and the actions present a 
severe threat of harm to others. Both the murderer at the door and the individual in 
the theater forfeit their entitlement against interference because they breach the 
standards of colegislation with other rational agents by assaulting their autonomy.  
I will now repeat what I said above using censorship as a stand in for deception. 
There is not a practical contradiction when censorship is allowed in defense of the 
autonomy of oneself or others. The foundational value of communication is that it 
promotes autonomy and allows individuals to realize their own projects and ends. An 
agent will only practically will a system of effective communication insofar as it 
contributes to the preservation of a justified autonomous sphere of action for 
individuals. An agent commits no practical contradiction by censoring in defense of 
the autonomy of oneself or others because the agent is willing the universally coherent 
means in the world to respect their autonomy. Such means will largely demand honest 
communication but will admit of certain principled exceptions. Thus, defending the 




I began the chapter by discussing the fact that humans are agents and this 
imposes a structure of obligations on our reasoning. As reflective creatures, we are 
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forced to structure our choices and values in a way that makes our lives intelligible. 
Reasoning is the process by which we make our lives intelligible so we have obligations 
to be rational. Therefore, any valid moral theory needs to have a rational structure. I 
then considered what type of rational structure is necessary for any valid moral theory 
to have. As the structure of reasoning is accessible to all rational agents, a rational 
principle needs to be universally valid for all rational agents. This is the principle of 
universalizability which holds that rational principles must be universally and 
conclusively reached by all equally rational agents who impartially weigh the 
considerations at issue. The second principle of rationality is the principle of 
coherence which states that all rational principles must be coherent and cannot 
contradict any other rational principles. Therefore, any valid moral principle must be 
universally coherent.  
The argument above is a formal framework of rationality. It claims that all valid 
moral theories must be universally coherent in order for a rational agent to act 
intelligibly with respect to it. A weaker claim this chapter presents is that all moral 
theories must abide by certain standards of rational consistency. This chapter also 
went beyond simply formal considerations and also defended a more substantive view 
of lying and censorship. Many different moral theories can pass the formal framework 
outlined above. However, I argue that these theories are substantively lacking if they 
do not allow agents to defend their autonomy and the autonomy of others from 
unjustified interference. I rejected several theories that fail to establish this principle 
and I ultimately defend a theory that has a principled basis for interfering with others 
to the extent they violate the autonomy of rational agents. 
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I claim that every rational agent should be practically committed to an effective 
structure of communication. An agent commits a practical contradiction if they 
simultaneously will a world with effective communication structures and also engage 
in behavior that subverts the value of communication structures. Communication is 
crucial for realizing many important moral values and so interfering with the 
communication of others is a prima facie wrong. However, there are certain cases 
where we think strategic communication can be used to interfere with the 
communication of others. Most people believe it is permissible to lie to the murderer at 
the door and to censor the speaker who is going to intentionally and falsely yell fire in 
a crowded theater. The paradox of communication is the need for a moral theory to 
have a universally coherent position that explains why it is wrong in most cases to 
interfere with communication but justified to interfere with the murderer at the door 
and the theater speaker without committing a practical contradiction. I outlined 
several moral theories which try and explain this paradox. 
I argue that the liberal argument for free expression is the moral theory that 
best solves the paradox of communication. It explains why censorship is usually 
wrong because it violates the autonomy of others but also provides a principled basis 
for censorship in both cases we considered. This liberal model is equipped to permit 
deception in the murderer and Nazi at the door cases. Moreover, its appeal to 
autonomy through and through makes it a viable rational framework because it rests 
on a universally coherent principle. Autonomy is the core value that is defended on a 
principled basis universally for each rational agent. As autonomy is the controlling 
value, appealing to it avoids a rational contradiction.  
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The account of the liberal censor that I have outlined is concerned with 
censoring only in the name of preserving individual autonomy. Certain forms of speech 
are an unjustified interference against the autonomy of others and can be permissibly 
censored like in the theater case. I acknowledge that this standard is very vague at the 
moment. While many might support the liberal model I have outlined in the abstract, 
there are serious disagreements about what constitutes an unjustified interference 
against the autonomy of others that permits censorship. In the next chapter I 
elaborate on these different theories of individual entitlements with respect to the 
liberal theory and argue that many attempts at censorship under the guise of the 
liberal model are unjustified. Many attempts to censor in the name of liberalism are 
contradictory and censoring on that basis would be an act of hypocrisy. The work of 
the third chapter will be to pare down the liberal principle of censorship into a more 





Chapter 2: The Hypocritical Censors 
 
Introduction 
 In the previous chapter I laid the groundwork for censorship that is justified in 
order to prevent the unjustified infringement of autonomy against oneself or others. I 
will refer to this moral framework of censorship as the Liberal Censor. In Chapter 3 I 
will offer a more detailed outline and defense of the Liberal Censor substantive thesis 
and argue that it is the only justified defense of censorship. However, there are many 
other arguments for various kinds of censorship. This chapter will consider four of the 
more prominent censorship arguments. These censorship arguments attempt to be 
liberal because they want to preserve a government allowing a wide range of 
expression and one that broadly protects the expression of individuals. They propose 
limited forms of censorship in the name of what they perceive to be liberal values. I 
will argue that all of these arguments are hypocritical because they violate the formal 
rational framework outlined in Chapter 1. Each of these theories censor some speech 
but fail to censor speech that can be principally censored under the same principle. 
This position is untenable because if the principle offered by the hypocritical censors 
is universalized then the hypocritical censor commits a practical contradiction in the 
type of censorship they will. 
Hypocritical censors attempt to will a principle of censorship that cannot be 
universalized. Hypocrisy is wrong because it fails to treat rational agents with equal 
moral standing by holding agents to different speech standards that are rationally 
incoherent. I will argue that in order to avoid hypocrisy these types of censors need to 
commit themselves to universalizing the principles of censorship they advance. If they 
do so then they will move from being a hypocritical censor to an ideal censor which 
46 
 
adheres to the formal standards of rationality. Nonetheless, these ideal censors, while 
formally valid, are not equal substantively. I will argue in Chapter 3 that all the ideal 
censors except the Liberal censor suffer substantive defects. The Liberal Censor is the 
acceptable censor formally and substantively.45  
Many people subscribe to one of the four censorship strategies considered 
below and accept the permissibility of censorship according to community standards, 
offense, hate speech, or promoting democratic discourse. I will point out that the 
principles they attempt to censor speech if universalized would be illiberal. One could, 
of course, find ways to censor the kinds of speech outlined in this chapter but that 
would require committing to much more authoritarian and implausible moral 
principles that go beyond what most want to commit to. The censors in this chapter 
are hypocritical if they try maintain themselves as liberal censors because they are 
carving out exceptions for themselves without applying the standards universally and 
in all cases in which they apply. This is morally wrong because it deprives the people 
who are victims of this kind of censorship of due process. T.M. Scanlon explains that 
due process “aims to provide some assurance of nonarbitrariness by requiring those 
who exercise authority to justify their intended actions.”46 If moral principles are not 
consistently applied then this violates rational standards and remove the justificatory 
power officials have to censor.  
The hypocritical censors act wrongly because they deprive others of due process 
and subject them to the force of arbitrary authority. Ultimately there is a disconnect 
between the principles of actions and the character the “liberal” censors impute to 
                                                          
45 The third chapter will also make arguments for why the Liberal Censor is superior in terms of ideal and non-ideal 
moral theory as well. 
46 T.M. Scanlon, The Difficulty of Tolerance: Essays in Political Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 44. 
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themselves. Everyone who rejects the authority for officials to use force in an arbitrary 
manner should reject hypocritical censorship and demand due process for those who 
are censored, a demand that censorship is justified according to consistently applied 
rational standards. This chapter will outline four hypocritical censors who fail to 
consistently apply their censorship standards because they do not want to act 
illiberally. I compare these hypocritical censors on the left to the consistent censors on 
the right of the table. The censors on the left have a corresponding consistent censors 
on the right one would need to commit to in order to make the application of their 
censorship principle extensionally adequate. The consistent censors will be discussed 
in the third chapter and they anchor their moral justifications in deeper values which 
ultimately deviate in important ways from the liberal censor model. 
 
The Cultural Relativism Censor Majority Rules Democracy 
The Humanitarian Censor The Utilitarian Censor 
The Hate Speech Censor The Radical Egalitarian Censor 
The Democratic Censor The Maximal Autonomy Censor 
 
Section I: The Cultural Relativist Censor 
 The first hypocritical censor that I will consider is the cultural relativism 
censor. This censor believes there is not an objective character to morality and that 
our practices of speech censorship should be evaluated culture to culture rather than 
according to universal standards. In the first chapter I argued that we should think of 
morality objectively and focus on universally coherent standards for assessing the 
morality of our conduct. The cultural relativist censor pushes back against these 
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foundational principles. The cultural relativist avoids representing the conduct of 
people from other cultures as right or wrong because they believe they lack an 
independent standard which allows for such a characterization. Lacking a universal 
standard of judgement, the cultural relativist argues that our cultural practices are 
not special but instead “merely one among many.”47  
The speech relativist sees differences in approaches to speech regulation in 
different cultures and claims that we cannot find objective features that decide which 
approach is objectively superior amidst these differences. For example, the speech 
relativist might point to the very different cultural approaches to free expression 
between the United States and Europe. The United States sets very strenuous 
constraints on when the government can limit free expression whereas most European 
governments have speech regulations that are more strongly balanced against other 
social considerations.48 At this point, the relativist is inclined to throw their hands in 
the air and say something along the lines of “America has their speech standards and 
Europe has theirs” and state that we cannot decide morally between these 
approaches. These differences in what societies consider to be moral behavior lead 
cultural relativists directly to the conclusion that there are no objective and universal 
answers to moral questions. Consequently, cultural relativism strips morality of its 
objective content that transcend particular human societies. The applicable 
censorship principle can be expressed as follows: 
 
                                                          
47 James Rachels, “The Challenge of Cultural Relativism,” in Exploring Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology, ed. 
S.M. Cahn, 4th ed. (Oxford University Press, 2009), 3. 
48 Ivan Hare and James Weinstein, Extreme Speech and Democracy, 1 edition (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), 2. 
49 
 
Cultural Relativist Censorship Principle: 
Individuals have no authority or ability to declare which cultural practices are more right 
or moral than others. Censorship standards should be determined uniquely by each 
human cultural community. 
The idea of cultural relativism leans heavily on the idea of authority and that we 
are not able to establish that other cultures are objectively wrong in their approach to 
morality. Accepting the argument for cultural relativism would have serious 
implications that would erode authority from our concept of morality. If this occurs 
then morality would be devoid of value. If morality is relative then there are no 
standards for criticizing the cultural practices of others because there is no 
independent standard of morality to appeal to. If a culture engages in slavery then we 
have no moral ammunition to judge or criticize them because the moral views of that 
society are completely derived from that particular culture. I want to distinguish 
between two types of cultural relativists: strong relativists and weak relativists. Strong 
relativists argue that humans have moral obligations to follow the morality of their 
particular culture. This standard does not work. For example, if you were born into a 
culture that deemed slavery as a morally essential practice then the strong relativist 
argument would conclude that you have a moral obligation to practice slavery.49 
A cultural relativist wanting to avoid this conclusion could take refuge in the 
weak cultural relativist argument. In contrast to strong relativists, a weak relativist 
would say that morality is the product of human societies and that you as an 
individual have no moral obligation to comply with your society’s cultural dictates 
about morality. This approach is problematic for two key reasons. First, accepting this 
                                                          
49 I do not think any reader will accept this conclusion so I will not discuss strong cultural relativism further. 
50 
 
principle means you as an individual would lack the moral resources necessary to say 
that your society’s practice of slavery is immoral. All you would be able to say is that 
you disagree with what your society is doing but you would not be able to appeal to an 
objective moral standard that says that slavery is wrong and was always wrong 
independent of culture. A second issue is that the weak relativist approach fails to 
effectively ground moral obligations. If there is no objective moral obligation to act in 
certain ways and there is no societal moral obligation to act in certain ways then there 
is no independent source of moral obligations outside of individual preference. The 
view suggests that the only source of binding moral obligation is what the individual 
places on herself or himself. We do not normally think of moral obligations as being 
the source of “whatever I determine to be so is so” and typically we think of morality as 
being independent of ourselves. Moreover, if moral obligations reside with the 
individual then an individual would lack a moral obligation to abstain from murdering 
or enslaving others if they do not think that such moral obligations apply to them. If 
an individual chooses to not feel obligated to be moral then there is nothing 
independent of them to hold them morally accountable in the weak relativist view. If 
these conclusions are to be avoided then weak cultural relativism should not be 
accepted. 
For these reasons I think that both strong and weak cultural relativism 
arguments should be rejected. If there is a character of morality then it needs to be 
objective and have force independent of any particular individual and culture. We 
accept such independent standards with science and mathematics. There is no such 
thing as Indian chemistry or Chinese mathematics. There is only science or 
mathematics which holds force beyond any individual or culture. Analogously, we 
should believe there is no such thing as Indian or Chinese morality. Without saying 
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anything yet about what the moral standards are, we should think there is an 
objective character to morality and that morality would have universal authority and 
force across all rational agents and cultures. 
The speech relativist might pivot at this point and propose a universal standard 
of moral authority that would still preserve the concept of speech relativism between 
different societies. This principle is anchored in a majoritarian conception of 
democracy that says that a society has the sovereign authority to dictate laws that 
regulate its social order. I will call this the principle of democratic relativism. The 
fundamental premise of this argument is that societies have the right to determine the 
standards which govern them through their majorities. If the majority of Europeans 
and the majority of Americans in free democratic elections produce a different set of 
speech laws then both those laws should be acceptable to the democratic speech 
relativist. The view is that a society gets to require or prohibit certain forms of behavior 
according to the will of the majority. This relativist position tries to strike a liberal 
chord. To the speech relativist, it is liberal to respect the self-determined wishes of a 
society and it smacks of imperialism and arrogance to tell other democratic societies 
that their established customs and social regulations are objectively wrong. 
To avoid the objection I raised to cultural relativism above, the speech relativist 
must advance a moral principle that is universal and still maintains respect for 
different speech standards of cultures. The principle that is advanced is that the 
majority of society is justified in applying laws to shape the social construction of 
society as a whole. What behaviors that violate a society’s cultural code can be 
adjudicated through democratic elections, referendums, and expression of the 
majority of the people’s will in government. This may involve requiring minorities to 
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conform to certain modes of behavior by force. The pithy title of this form of democracy 
is “Majority Rules.” If this kind of democratic principle is advanced then it would 
create a speech relativism that would ultimately be anchored by a universal standard 
that all societies have the authority to use coercion to enforce compliance with what is 
determined by the society’s common moral code. Majorities of different societies have 
different preferences when it comes to speech they want expressed. American voting 
majorities would create different speech laws than Europe and create two different 
legal spheres of expression. Thus, this speech relativist would say that any speech 
regulation would be adequate if it is produced by a democratic majority in a society.  
This argument for democratic speech relativism should be rejected. The reason 
is that accepting this principle is incredibly shallow and would be a terrible principle 
to logically extend morally. The principle allows the use of coercion and the regulation 
of behavior simply because a majority of the people believe that this should be done. 
This is incredibly problematic because no standards are imposed on who gets to cast a 
ballot that regulates coercion in a society. A person could be a “village idiot” and still 
get a say in this theory about the use of force against others who do not wear, say, or 
think how they like. I use the term “village idiot” because nothing more is required of 
these voters by the democratic relativist. The principle of majority rules does not say 
that the majority has to cast ballots constrained by principle. Rather, this standard 
only requires that the people voting need to have their breath to stick to windows. 
People only must be a certain age and have the capacity to push a button. This theory 
is dangerous because it says that a village idiot, be they real or imagined, has a sliver 
of authority to coerce others on nothing more than the principle that they say so and 
desire certain things. Most people would not accept this shallow view of democracy.  
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A morally adequate view of democracy accepts constraints on how democracies 
are able to permissibly act and fundamentally limit the ability of majorities to infringe 
on the rights of minorities. If individuals have rights then those rights offer a bulwark 
against what capricious majorities can do. Therefore, the possession of individual 
rights would lead to the conclusion that the use of power by a majority cannot be 
untrammeled.50 If “majority rules” is an absolute principle of government then there 
would not be any end to what government can authorize in the name of the majority. 
There would be no such thing as the rule of law in this type of government because 
the rule of law would collapse in the face of a government that can dramatically and 
suddenly change the law to the whims of a majority. James Madison notes that 
democracies require a “safeguard against the tyranny of their own passions” so that 
they escape “the indelible reproach of decreeing to the same citizens the hemlock on 
one day and statutes on the next.”51  
We do not accept that majorities can simply trample on the rights of individuals 
because they are in the majority. It is ridiculous to say that who someone can marry, 
what they can wear, and what they are able to say can be simply overturned because 
they were outvoted. Michael Huemer rightly points out that a vote of a majority of 
people is inadequate to confer legitimacy to use coercion against others. He imagines a 
case where you walk into a bar and someone suggests that you pay for everyone’s 
drinks in the bar. Over your objection, the majority of people vote to have you pay for 
                                                          
50 I recognize that I owe a further defense to the claim that individuals have rights. I will pick up this discussion in 
chapter 3. I leave the claim here that individuals have rights because I believe that most readers believe that 
individuals have rights that are derived independently from what a majority dictates. 
51 Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New American 
Library, 2003), 383. 
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the drinks.52 Of course, you have no obligation to pay for everyone’s drinks because 
the bare principle of a majority rules is ridiculous. A majority, just because it is the 
majority, cannot use force to regulate bar tabs, social behavior, and speech. Therefore, 
we should reject democratic relativism because its underlying principle is not a 
plausible one. 
In this section I considered three variants of the argument for relativism. These 
relativists attack the whole project of finding moral principles for speech regulation 
from the outset. They think that societies are in a unique position to dictate the kinds 
of speech that are acceptable and use coercion to enforce their particular cultural 
view. All of these variants are incorrect. Strong relativism states that individuals have 
a moral obligation to follow the policies of their own culture. This proposition would 
assert that individuals have the moral obligation to abide with laws like slavery if that 
is what their culture prescribes. Weak relativism abandons the obligation argument 
but contends that there are no objective moral standards allowing one to objectively 
criticize their culture or the cultures of others. Accepting weak relativism would mean 
retreating from morality in terms of objective standards and this would shatter our 
ability to make effective moral criticisms and judgements. Finally, democratic 
relativism is the view that majorities in societies have the right to prescribe laws and 
use coercion to enforce them. This majority rules conception of democracy would allow 
speech regulation if the majority of society supports it. However, this principle should 
be rejected because a majority by itself has no inherent moral legitimacy. Accepting 
this view of democracy would require forsaking the concept of individual rights 
                                                          
52 Michael Huemer, The Problem of Political Authority: An Examination of the Right to Coerce and the Duty to Obey 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 75. 
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because the majority rules view of democracy promotes the untrammeled use of power 
of majorities in a democracy.  
I will later discuss a richer account of democracy that accepts fundamental 
constraints on its power. My aim in this section is to dismantle the shallow and feeble 
account of democracy that grants authority to majorities because it is a majority. This 
Majority Rules conception of democracy cannot stand according to a plausible 
universally coherent principle. If this principle cannot stand then we would not be able 
to say that “Europe has their speech standards and we have ours” because the 
majority of Europeans elected for a particular approach. Differences in standards 
relating to speech relativism cannot withstand moral scrutiny because the moral 
principle they rest upon is hollow. With the relativism arguments being deficient we 
should search for standards of speech regulation that are grounded in universally 
coherent principles that can be logically extended objectively across all human 
societies and across all persons. The remainder of chapter 2 will consider three further 
arguments that fall short of this standard. 
 
Section II: The Humanitarian Censor 
 Most discussions of the justification for censorship usually involve questions of 
harm. John Stuart Mill famously defended the right of free expression in society and 
argued in favor of the benefits of a free society where the state’s authority to curtail 
speech is limited.53 Thus, Mill claimed that protecting free expression would benefit 
society more on balance than limits on such expression. However, Mill also claimed 
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that free expression could not be unlimited and allowed for the state to limit speech 
which “without justifiable cause, do harm to others.”54 He goes on to say that “The 
liberty of the individual must be thus far limited; he must not make himself a 
nuisance to other people.”55 These statements help to form the basis of Mill’s Harm 
Principle where the state cannot liberty for a person’s own good but that they are able 
to limit liberty when actions pose an unjustifiable risk of harm to others. Such a 
distinction is not very helpful to us unless the types of harm that can be prohibited 
are specified. This is because one’s view of harm can either be expansive or narrow. 
There are at least two conceptually distinct forms of harm that speech can cause: 
rights based harms and welfare based harms. I will argue that Mill’s Harm Principle 
can be coherently extended for rights based harms but should not be coherently 
extended for welfare based harms. The person that wishes to coherently extend the 
Harm Principle for welfare based harms becomes the Utilitarian Censor which I will 
discuss in more detail in Chapter 3. 
 Mill is correct that all speech cannot be tolerated because some kinds of speech 
cause unjustifiable harms. Jeffrey Howard argues that “the moral right to freedom of 
expression, properly interpreted, does not protect speech that incites clear violations of 
others’ moral rights.”56 Unjustifiable harms are harms that violate the rights of 
individuals and certain kinds of speech can violate rights. As Howard notes, speech 
restrictions are acceptable when they prevent “incontrovertible” rights violations that 
infringe on the bodily autonomy of individuals.57 Chapter 1 highlighted the Fire Case 
                                                          
54 Mill, 121. 
55 Mill, 121. 
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where a speaker intentionally and falsely yells fire in a crowded theater to start a panic 
and harm others. This is a case where individual rights are “incontrovertibly” violated 
and the bodily autonomy of individuals are directly threatened. Now let’s consider 
another case. 
The Bullhorn Case: 
Frank believes that taxation is theft and that the government violates his rights when it 
taxes him. He wishes to express his displeasure of government taxation policies so he 
finds the address of an IRS agent named Sue. At 2:00 AM he goes outside the IRS 
agent’s home and uses a bullhorn to loudly complain about taxation policies which 
wakes up Sue and prevents her family from sleeping. 
 I think it is clear that Sue’s rights are violated by Frank’s speech based on the 
context in which he spoke. By using a bullhorn to disrupt the agent’s sleep and to 
loudly speak at night outside the agent’s home she is not able to reasonably avoid the 
speech. It is not the substance of Frank’s comments which violate the agent’s rights 
but rather the manner in which he presents them. Frank is conducting a kind of 
assault by directing sound waves in an unjustifiably disruptive manner. Sue is 
entitled as an autonomous agent to a certain sphere of control where she can exercise 
her bodily autonomy. Frank infringes on this sphere of control by projecting harmful 
noise at night where Sue should have the right to sleep in peace in certain areas like 
her home that within her sphere of control. Nonetheless, a person’s sphere of control 
will vary with the particular environment they are in. For instance, if Frank is yelling 
in the middle of the day in a public park about how taxation is theft and Sue hears it 
while passing through a public park her rights are not violated. Likewise, Sue does not 
have her rights violated if she receives a letter from Frank accusing her of violating the 
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rights of individuals and stealing from people. Her rights are not violated in these 
latter cases because the sphere of control in which the agent operates has changed. 
Sue lacks authority to control messaging in a public park and as a public official she 
does not have the right to exclude public commentary on her actions. In chapter 3 I 
will elaborate more on a theory of rights and when individuals have claims against 
others for speech. For the time being I will consider the argument that individuals can 
also be censored for speech that causes general welfare based harms. 
 I titled this section the Humanitarian Censor because it is drawn from 
Jonathan Rauch’s discussion of individuals who are concerned with humanitarian or 
welfare based harms from the speech of others.58 The Humanitarian Censor takes a 
more expansive view of harm and thinks that speech that undermines the welfare of 
others can be permissibly regulated. Speech can also cause offense that affects the 
sensibilities of others. One may take the approach that the state has the right to limit 
any speech that can provide a setback to the welfare interests of any other individual. 
Yet, this principle would be absurd if it were to be extended because an individual’s 
welfare interests are dependent on factors that do not provide a reasonable 
justification for censorship.  
To see why restricting speech for welfare based harms is extensionally 
inadequate let us return to the Bullhorn Case. The IRS agent Sue has her welfare 
linked at least in part by what other people think of her. Her welfare drops when 
others speak poorly of her and when her reputation is harmed. The extent to which 
her welfare changes is moderated by her personal feelings that are subjective to her as 
a person. Put more bluntly, some people have thick skins while others have thin 
                                                          




skins. Imagine that Sue has a fellow IRS agent named Sarah who has incredibly thick 
skin. Sarah can sustain blistering criticism and shrug the words of others off without 
any effect on her welfare. In contrast, Sue has very thin skin. She is like an eggshell 
and will shatter in the face of even slight criticism. While Sue is on her way to work as 
an IRS agent she encounters Frank in a public park who is holding a sign that says 
that those who work for the IRS are thieves and are violating the rights of individuals. 
Upon seeing this sign Sue shatters. The allegation that she is a thief devastates her 
welfare and makes her incredibly upset. We can imagine that she enters work and is 
unable to focus, her relationship with her colleagues suffers, and her family no longer 
brightens her day as much as they used to. Sue has clearly suffered severe harms to 
her welfare and well-being as a result of Frank’s speech. If the government has the 
moral license to censor speech that undermines the welfare of others then it would be 
clearly justified in censoring Frank’s speech. Frank derives a small amount of welfare 
gain from holding up the sign but its effect is absolutely devastating to Sue.  
The harm to Sue’s welfare alone does not provide an adequate reason to censor 
Frank’s speech and to prevent him from expressing his opinion. If one were to accept 
the moral principle that the state should censor any speech that causes significant 
welfare based harms then one would be morally committed to prevent Frank from 
speaking in the public park. To adopt this approach, one would have to come up with 
a consistent ground for censoring welfare based harms across persons. The Utilitarian 
Censor that I will discuss in chapter 3 does just this by using utility as the framework 
for comparing the benefits and costs of actions. This type of ideal censor claims that 
welfare based harms when it comes to utility are a permissible ground for censorship. 
I will set aside this argument for now until the third chapter. 
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Having initially rejected the principle of censoring speech on the basis of welfare 
based harms broadly construed, I now turn to the argument that offensive speech can 
serve as a grounds for censorship. The Humanitarian Censor is sympathetic to 
censoring certain kinds of offensive speech because offense can negatively impact the 
welfare of those subjected to the speech. Joel Feinberg argues that actions that cause 
certain forms of offense can be permissibly regulated by the state even if they are not 
harmful. This occurs because what is offensive and what is harmful are not 
necessarily related.59 To support this position Feinberg outlines a framework for 
evaluating when offensive conduct can be prohibited.  
The Offense Principle: 
“It is always a good reason in support of a proposed criminal prohibition that it would 
probably be an effective way of preventing serious offense (as opposed to injury or 
harm) to persons other than the actor, and that it is probably a necessary means to that 
end.”60 
 Feinberg clarifies that the Offense Principle relates to wrongful offense where 
offense is a disliked state caused by another that is worthy of resentment.61 Certain 
speech acts cause offense because there are a multitude of expressions which cause 
disliked states that individuals believe are worthy of resentment. However, the Offense 
Principle has to be moderated and cannot assert that any offense to a particular 
individual of a certain magnitude can be prohibited. There are several reasons for this 
and they are based in the fact that offensiveness is a subjective emotional experience. 
First, offensiveness varies between agents due to background experiences and what 
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agents find to be symbolically important. For example, a person saying that “Jesus 
Christ was an evil cult leader” could deeply offend a devoted Christian while making 
an atheist or even another Christian smile. Second, the magnitude of offense varies 
from person to person. Recall the case of Sue and Sarah above. Sue has an eggshell 
personality when it comes to offensive statements about the IRS whereas Sarah has a 
very thick skin to such slights. A negative statement about the IRS could offend both 
Sue and Sarah but Sue would be much more seriously affected. Finally, offense even 
varies in affect and magnitude for individual agent’s themselves over time. When I 
would visit the zoo as a young child I loved visiting the gorilla exhibit and was 
particularly enthralled when the gorillas would throw up in their hands and then eat 
their vomit. Now I find that I am revolted watching that process as an adult. 
Individuals can change their life outlooks over time. A young person may be an atheist 
at a young age and not be offended by criticism of Christianity but then become a 
devoted Christian later in life and be deeply offended by similar statements. Thus, the 
severity of offensiveness is moderated by an individual’s background, their particular 
resiliency against what can be offensive, and the changes an individual experiences in 
these dimensions over time. 
 The features of offense that change from person to person poses a serious 
challenge for creating a moral principle for regulating free expression. Chapter 1 
established that rational moral principles must be universally coherent. But offense is 
extraordinarily contingent and speech cannot have a universally offensive effect. As 
Justice John Harlan once said “One man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.”62 One could 
resolve this difficulty by saying that severely offensive speech of any form can be 
                                                          




prohibited by the state. I will call this the broad offense principle. This principle does 
not work because the principle, unsurprisingly, would be too broad. Let’s return to the 
IRS case. Imagine that when Frank holds up his sign “IRS agents are thieves” in a 
public park in the proximity of Sue he causes severe offense. When he does so around 
Sarah there is minimal offense. If Sue walks to the park on Tuesdays and Thursdays 
then a broadly construed offense principle would say that the state can coerce Frank 
when he displays the sign on Tuesdays and Thursdays but not on days when Sue is 
walking through the park. This is a ridiculous standard because Frank would have no 
reasonable way of ascertaining when his speech would cause severe offense and 
because one person’s offense should not dictate when someone can engage in basic 
freedoms to express oneself.  
Another problem of accepting this broad offense principle is that statements 
like “women should have equal rights” that deeply offend a committed misogynist 
would fall under the state’s authority to censor because it would involve severely 
offensive speech. Additionally, certain expressions in a public park like a gay or 
interracial couple expressing affection could severely distress a homophobe or racist. A 
moral principle that lets the homophobe or racist’s distress in this case provide a 
reason for censorship is no valid principle at all. The state cannot regulate speech on 
the basis of welfare harms from offense because the regulation would contingently 
vary from person to person and limit expressions that we believe individuals are 
entitled to express. 
 Based on these concerns, Feinberg offers principles that mediate the Offense 
Principle to offer a more coherent principle that does not invite “wholesale and 
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intuitively unwarranted legal interference.”63 Feinberg proposes that offensive conduct 
should be mediated by the following factors:64 
1. Whether the offensiveness is of a serious magnitude. 
2. Whether those who are offended by the conduct can reasonably avoid being 
offended. 
3. Whether or not those offended willingly assume the risks of being offended. 
4. Whether or not the person being offended is a standard observer. 
Feinberg thinks that offensive conduct can be prohibited when it creates offense of a 
serious magnitude that a standard observer who has not willingly assumed the risk of 
being offended cannot reasonably avoid being offended. I will call this the Modified 
Offense Principle (MOP). The MOP offers more useful resources for avoiding the 
unwelcome conclusions reached through the broad offense principle. The MOP would 
not allow the state to censor Frank’s speech on the basis of offense because Sue is not 
a standard observer and she is able to reasonably avoid the speech by not traveling 
through the public park. A lot of offensive speech that occurs in specific areas like 
adult theaters, books, or internet sites would also be protected from the MOP because 
standard observers would be able to reasonably avoid being exposed to such speech.  
Feinberg uses the MOP to justify regulations of certain kinds of severely 
offensive speech like the Nazis marching and displaying anti-semitic symbols in the 
predominantly Jewish neighborhood of Skokie. Feinberg thinks that the offense in 
Skokie justifies regulation even if no one is harmed and no rights are violated because 
the conduct passes satisfies the MOP and there are no sufficient social interests in 
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hearing the speech to “balance” it against the offense caused. The MOP is a standard 
that attempts to maintain a liberal state where speech is broadly protected. At the 
same time, the MOP functions to exclude certain severely offensive speech from public 
discourse. 
 I disagree with Feinberg’s modified offense principle and I do not believe that it 
can provide an adequate moral principle for censoring speech. I argue that offense is 
never a justifying reason for social regulation of individual conduct. Offense may be 
coupled with conduct that can be prohibited but never provides an independent 
reason for legal prohibition. For instance, a stranger may slap me and I may be 
offended that he did so. The stranger may be criminally punished for slapping me but 
he may not be punished or his punishment exacerbated because I took offense. The 
reason why the MOP should not be accepted is that it would generate justifications for 
state authority that are simply unpalatable. For example, consider the following case: 
The Gruesome Man  
Rick has lived an unfortunate life. When he was younger his house caught fire killing his 
family. While Rick escaped, he suffered horrendous and permanent burn injuries. His 
appearance is now gruesome and standard observers look at him they cannot help but 
to shudder and feeling a sense of revulsion. In short, Rick’s appearance is offensive on 
sight because he causes others to suffer unpleasant feelings when looking on him that 
lead them to resent Rick’s presence. His disfigurations cause more offense and revulsion 
than even the public display of the most hard core pornography. Rick enjoys taking 
walks in the public park where people see him and are severely offended by his 
presence. One day a police officer comes up to Rick and gives him a criminal citation 
after having warned him one time before against walking in the park. By publicly 
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displaying his appearance Rick is causing offense to others under Feinberg’s modified 
offense principle and is now liable to be coerced by the state.65 
 I am assuming that the reader will find it unconscionable that Rick should be 
criminally liable in principle for walking in a public park. Nonetheless, Rick’s actions 
do fall under the MOP. The offense he causes is of a serious magnitude to a standard 
observer, others find it hard to reasonably avoid seeing him in a public park, and the 
risk of being offended by Rick’s appearance is not willingly assumed.66 I think the 
Gruesome Man case points to a reason why the MOP should be rejected. Even if it 
causes offense, Rick’s appearance offending others is not a reason at all for criminal 
prosecution. 
 Another key problem with Feinberg’s MOP is the mediating principle that says 
that severe offense must be experienced by a “standard observer.” This is because 
what is a standard observer depends on how wide one casts a net over an area to 
survey the observers to determine what is standard. The standard observer would 
dramatically change if the area surveyed was a tiny religious town in Alabama, or the 
entire state of Alabama, or the entire United States, or the global population. Which of 
these “standard” observers shall we select? Feinberg does not propose an adequate 
mechanism for determining what a standard observer would be and the area one 
selects can lead one to opposite conclusions under the MOP. Making a joke at the 
expense of the Prophet Muhammad may not be severely offensive if your standard 
observer is in the United States but would be extremely offensive if one’s sample size 
for standard observers come from Iran. The larger one goes in terms of the area 
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sampled makes it more difficult to determine what is standard. After all, the vast 
diversity across the globe and even in the United States alone means that there really 
is no “standard” observer that one can mechanistically average to make 
determinations of criminal liability. Making the sample size narrower creates a whole 
new set of problems because you are now empowering a small group with the power to 
criminalize subjectively determined offensive conduct. For instance, if your sample size 
is Iran or a small religious town in Alabama then the sight of a gay couple holding 
hands would likely be extremely offensive to “standard” observers there and would 
provide a reason for criminal prohibition of the offensive conduct. Thus, Feinberg’s 
MOP should be rejected because of its inability to formulate a standard observer. 
 Feinberg’s MOP should also be rejected because accepting it leads to a dilemma 
with two unpalatable options. The MOP can be thought of as either a formal or 
substantive constraint on the censor. A formal constraint says that so long as the four 
conditions of the MOP are met then that provides a reason for censorship. A formal 
constraint is inadequate because it would not be able to rule out certain forms of 
expression to be suppressed as offensive. If Frank walking in a public park or a gay 
couple holding hands causes a sufficient kind of distress of a certain kind then it 
cannot be formally excluded from the MOP. Accepting the principle of limiting 
offensive conduct as a formal constraint on the censor means accepting a chilling 
infringement on liberty. As Orwell once said “If liberty means anything at all, it means 
the right to tell people what they do not want to hear.”67 There are countless cases of 
individuals being offended by the truth. Justice Louis Brandeis emphasized that “the 
                                                          




function of speech is to free men from the bondage of irrational fears.”68 Offense itself 
can embody the subjective emotions of people that reflect their irrational fears. 
Prohibiting offense would then pose a direct threat to the functional value of speech 
itself. Moreover, even if speech is wrong there is still value in its autonomous exercise 
and wrong to limit autonomy on the grounds of offense alone. The wrong of censoring 
on the basis of offense is encapsulated in the case of the United Kingdom where 
authorities criminally cited a 15 year old boy for peacefully holding the sign that read 
“Scientology is not a religion, it is a dangerous cult.”69 There is no doubt the boy’s 
speech deeply offended some. The authorities justified their actions by saying that the 
community had a “right” not to be “alarmed” or “distressed” by others.70 The distress 
the sign causes is no reason for criminal prohibition. Even if the boy was wrong and 
Scientology was not a cult or all of its tenets were objectively true that would still not 
be a good reason to censor the boy. There are some basic liberties, like the boy holding 
his sign, a gay couple holding hands, or Rick walking in the park, that should not 
yield to the offense of others. Offense based concerns are absolutely silenced by 
certain entitlements to expression. 
 One could avoid the challenges of making the MOP a formal constraint by 
making it a substantive constraint. A substantive constraint would say that some 
types of offense provide no reason at all for censoring speech. For instance, a 
substantive constraint could say that the fact that a racist, sexist, or homophobe are 
offended do not provide reasons for censoring speech. Additionally, this position could 
declare that certain expressions, like Rick walking in the park, are categorically 
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permissible and will not yield to offense based considerations. The problem with this 
substantive approach is that it violates the moral framework of universal coherence. It 
diminishes certain kinds of offense and elevates certain kinds of expression. In effect, 
a substantive MOP would require importing a whole new moral principle which would 
say when it is acceptable to dismiss certain kinds of offense, like that suffered by the 
racist, and when certain kinds of expression, like walking in the park as you are, must 
be tolerated by society.  
If one imports a new moral principle then that new moral principle does all of 
the moral work in the case and not offense. For example, imagine that it is important 
to several women that they get to jog each morning topless through the park. The sight 
of the topless women causes several birdwatchers in the park to be deeply offended. 
The women respond that, like Frank, they are just inhabiting the park “as they are” 
and that it is important to them to enjoy the park as they are. Offense does no 
substantive work in deciding the claims of Frank and the topless women in these 
cases. What matters is whether these individuals are entitled to be in the park as they 
are. If offense is said to form a basis for determining entitlements then we are back to 
offense functioning as a formal constraint with all of its accompanying problems 
discussed above.  
We do not think that Rick’s offensive appearance provides a reason for him to 
be removed for the park but that other considerations outweigh. Rather, we simply 
think Rick has the right to be in the park. Similarly, we do not “weigh” the sexist’s 
offense at being exposed to feminist speech and then “balance out” the considerations 
of the feminist to let her speak. Offense is ultimately irrelevant in how we construct 
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considerations of censorship. Thus, we should never think of offense as a justifying 
reason in itself to censor speech. 
 
Section III: The Hate Speech Censor 
 
 In the previous section I raised the case of Nazis marching in Skokie as a case 
where one may be inclined to censor the speech of those individuals according to the 
Offense Principle. However, we rejected the Offense Principle as a principle because it 
was not an extensionally adequate moral principle. The Hate Speech Censor is worried 
about speech like the Nazis at Skokie being expressed. Andrew Altman points out that 
“even when it involves no direct threat of violence, hate speech can cause abiding 
feelings of fear, anxiety, and insecurity in those at whom it is targeted.”71 The Hate 
Speech Censor seeks to limit hate speech which targets the dignity of certain groups 
while still preserving a social structure that is broadly tolerant of dissent and the open 
exchange of ideas. Censoring on the basis of offense requires positional judgements 
because who is offended can depend on the subjective position of those offended. 
However, censoring for human dignity has an advantage because human dignity does 
not require a positional perspective and can be universally upheld across all rational 
agents. Thus, the hate speech censor attempts to advance a universally coherent 
moral principle that allows censorship in defense of human dignity. I will argue that 
the Hate Speech Censor is unable to preserve this balance between censorship for 
dignity and liberal tolerance because the moral principles underlying these 
approaches are fundamentally in tension. 
                                                          




Jeremy Waldron has prominently argued that censorship of hate speech can be 
justified within liberal societies. He argues that all people are entitled to dignity which 
consists of their “social standing, the fundamentals of basic reputation that entitle 
them to be treated as equals in the ordinary operations of society.”72 Waldron thinks 
that one’s dignity or social standing is a public good based on the assurance that 
other members of society respect the social standing of others.73 He defines hate 
speech as publications “which express profound disrespect, hatred, and vilification for 
the members of minority groups.”74 Hate speech has the ability to undermine a 
society’s public good for assuring equal social standing for all members in a society. 
Thus, Waldron argues that censorship of hate speech can be justified in order to 
maintain an egalitarian sense of dignity with in a society. This reasoning would 
support the censorship of the Nazis at Skokie because their speech and waving Nazi 
flags would profoundly disrespect minority groups and undermine their confidence 
that their society respects their equal claim to dignity. Waldron’s approach offers a 
different moral principle that does not seek to censor the Nazis at Skokie for offensive 
conduct. Rather, he would justify their censorship on the basis of speech threatening 
the entitlement of people to participate in society with a basic assurance to dignity or 
social standing.  
 I disagree with Waldron’s argument on several levels. My first problem with his 
argument is that a person’s dignity is not based on social assurance. Dignity is 
something intrinsic and irrevocable in virtue of an agent’s rational status and is a 
birthright of a person’s humanity. If others can think or speak ill of you and you 
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suddenly lose your dignity then that is a shallow conception of dignity. My conception 
of human dignity nods back to Kant who thought that our rationality allows us to 
realize value in the world when we make objects the subject of our rational choice. 
Christine Korsgaard explains that for Kant “we confer value on the objects of our 
rational choices” and to “choose something is to take it to be worth pursuing; and 
when choose things because they are important to us we are in effect taking ourselves 
to be important.”75 This is crucial because our value as agents, the source of our 
dignity, comes from within us.  
The implication of this Kantian argument is that our dignity is not conditional 
on the social assurance of others but rather on what we choose to value. If we value 
the hate of others or give it credence then it will assault our personal standing. 
Alternatively, if we choose to ignore the hatred of others then it will never be able to 
threaten our dignity as rational agents because we have chosen to ignore that vitriol. 
As Eleanor Roosevelt once eloquently noted, “No one can make you feel inferior 
without your consent.”76 If we choose to accept the substance of hate then it will affect 
our social standing. However, if we choose to not let hatred interfere with our 
perception of ourselves then one’s dignity will be impregnable to the speech of others. 
Hate speech can never inherently or unconditionally assault the dignity of others. The 
upshot is that censoring hate speech because of its threat to the dignity of others can 
never be based on a universally coherent moral principle. 
 Another problem with Waldron’s position is with how he defines the concept of 
hate speech. Recall that Waldron definition of hate speech involves speech expressing 
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“profound disrespect, hatred, and vilification for the members of minority groups.”77 
The trouble with this definition is that it allows only expressions which target minority 
groups to qualify as hate speech. Hateful rhetoric directed at majority groups would 
not fall under the definition of hate speech to be subject to censorship. But the 
difficulty discerning whether a person is part of a majority or minority runs into the 
same observer issue that Feinberg encounters when he attempts to define a “standard 
observer.” Whether a person is part of a majority or minority group is dependent the 
frame of reference one takes. A Jewish person from Israel is a member of a majority 
group when one’s reference is the area of Israel and Palestine. However, if your frame 
of reference is the entire Middle East then that Israeli would be considered a member 
of a minority group. A Christian living in a town of atheists would be a minority group 
member if you only consider that town but suddenly becomes a majority group 
member if you shift your frame of reference to the United States and suddenly back 
again to a minority if you take a global perspective. Any adequate moral principle has 
to be universally coherent. However, Waldron’s definition of hate speech violates the 
principle of universality by proposing a principle that fails to universally apply a moral 
standard across all persons. The attempt to define what a majority and minority group 
is wholly dependent on an arbitrary frame of reference. 
 Even if one could choose a frame of reference for deciding what a majority or 
minority group was there would still be a problem because it does not make much 
sense to make what people are allowed to say dependent on a fluctuating and 
arbitrary amount of people around them. To illustrate this point let us look at the 
following case: 
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The Hateful Proselytizer: 
Jane is a fervent Jehovah’s Witness and has very strong convictions about her faith. 
She is repulsed by Catholic teachings. Jane thinks that the effectiveness of Catholic 
teachings will end up being convincing and condemn her neighbors and friends to being 
outside of the grace of Jesus Christ. She goes into a town that is predominantly full of 
Jehovah’s Witnesses with a very small Catholic minority. Jane puts up very large signs 
that says things like “Catholics are agents of Satan,” “No loathsome Catholics are 
welcome here,” and “Cast away Catholic filth.” Several Catholics see the signs and 
appeal to the government to censor Jane. They argue that Jane has breached hate 
speech laws because Jane’s speech assaults their dignity and is “profoundly 
disrespectful” and vilifies their minority group. The state agrees and destroys Jane’s 
signs and jails her.78 
I will argue that the state should not censor Jane’s speech and has no plausible 
rational basis for jailing her. Jane certainly runs afoul of Waldron’s definition of hate 
speech due to the character of her attacks against a minority group. This case shows 
the challenge of defining what a minority group is. Catholics are a dominant group in 
many areas while within this imagined town they comprise a very small percentage of 
the population. Moreover, population dynamics can quickly alter whether or not 
speech is hate speech. Imagine that a week after Jane’s sermon the town experiences 
a mass of conversions to Catholicism and a large influx of immigrating Catholics. Now 
Catholics comprise 51% of the town’s population. It appears absurd that Jane can be 
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censored one week but not the next when the Catholics make up a slim majority of the 
population. Thus, the number of members of a particular group appears to provide no 
independent justification for whether or not speech should be censored. The number 
of members that are in a group and subjected to speech is morally arbitrary. 
What this example helps demonstrate is that there is no compelling standard for 
restricting hateful rhetoric only against groups that are minority groups. But a grant 
for the state to restrict any hateful rhetoric that demeans the identity of a group is way 
too broad. For example, consider six examples of speech Hateful Jane could put on 
her sign: 
1. “No loathsome Jews are welcome here” 
2. “No loathsome Blacks are welcome here” 
3. “No loathsome homosexuals are welcome here” 
4. “No loathsome whites are welcome here” 
5. “No loathsome Catholics are welcome here” 
6. “No loathsome Boston Red Sox fans are welcome here” 
My guess is that Waldron formulated his definition of hate speech to allow prohibiting 
the first three statements but not the latter three and certainly not the sixth 
statement. The problem is that all the statements demean a personal identity of a 
group individuals are affiliated with. Furthermore, there is no clear way of classifying 
which statements are more of a threat to a person’s dignity because it is dependent on 
what aspects of a person’s identity they care about. A person normally does not treat 
having green eyes as a salient part of their identity that should be publicly assured 
because they do not care about their eye color that much when it comes to 
conceptualizing their identity.  
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If identity is based on how individuals conceptualize it then the strength of 
one’s identity varies with the strength of individual conceptualizations. For instance, a 
particular Boston Red Sox fan may be Jewish but care much more about his identity 
as a Boston Red Sox fan than his Jewish identity. He may not bat an eye about slights 
against Judaism but be ready to crush the skull of anyone who would demean his 
beloved Boston Red Sox. It is very condescending to define what the greatest threats to 
an individual’s dignity are for them because a person’s dignity is the quintessential 
thing that is up to the individual. Any attempt to establish a “hierarchy of dignity” and 
only restrict the worst assaults on dignity would destroy dignity as a valuable concept. 
There is no clear basis for saying that human dignity should fall into a hierarchy at 
all. Even if human dignity were to be hierarchical there is no justified basis for saying 
that government officials have a better grasp on defining the objective “hierarchy of 
dignity” than individuals do. A view that would attempt to classify a kind of hierarchy 
of dignity would be committed to an objective dignity standard. However, adopting 
such a hierarchy of dignity is not feasible and it would mean that any standard that 
develops the hierarchy is arbitrary and would not make for a plausible standard to 
serve as the basis of censorship. 
There is not a plausible objective dignity standard. One could adopt a subjective 
dignity standard and say that threats to dignity are up to the individual and can 
justify censorship. But such a standard would not be tenable because it would be 
overly inclusive. Way too many cases of speech would be subject to censorship if 
individuals get to censor anything they consider to be an unwarranted attack on their 
identity. Severity of dignity based harm also would not plausibly work because an 
individual Boston Red Sox fan can suffer a greater dignity based harm with the attack 
on his sports team than an attack on his Jewish identity. If being a supporter of the 
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Boston Red Sox is a large part of an individual’s subjective identity then attacks on 
the Red Sox could threaten that person’s dignity and justify censorship according to 
this argument. Accepting a subjective dignity standard could allow the state to censor 
all six of the sentences Hateful Jane offers above. One could make this choice 
consistently but would end up sacrificing the moral plausibility and moral legitimacy 
of their position. A person who allows the state to censor all six of the hateful 
sentences above because they are all “hate speech” would give up any claim to 
advocating for a broadly liberal and tolerant society. Therefore, I conclude that there is 
no morally plausible and consistent basis for censoring hate speech if one also wishes 
to belong to a broadly tolerant and liberal society.  
Even if one were to reject the foregoing arguments and say that there is a 
justified moral standard for hate speech regulation we still should not grant the 
government the power to censor hate speech. There are practical objections to 
consider because of the abuse of government authority when it comes to censorship. 
Governments usually derive most of their power in service of the majority or powerful 
interests in society. As David Cole notes “in a democracy, the state acts in the name of 
majority, not the minority. Why would disadvantaged minorities trust representatives 
of the majority to decide whose speech should be censored?”79 There are plenty of 
examples of hate speech regulation used explicitly against minority groups as Nadine 
Strossen has extensively researched. In Rwanda hate speech regulation was imposed 
but then criticisms of the hate speech legislation were deemed “hate speech” that 
could have been censored.80 The University of Michigan implemented a hate speech 
code on its campus. Enforcement of the Michigan code was turned against minorities 
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with 20 instances of white students charging Black students with racist or 
discriminatory speech including for one Black student calling a white student “white 
trash.”81  
Regulating hate speech can also lead to the opposite of its intended effect. 
Timothy Garton Ash reports that studies in England found that “the logging of racist 
incidents in British schools had the perverse effect of racialising children’s perceptions 
of each other.”82 Maleiha Malik reviewed hate speech regulation and discovered that 
“incitement legislation often fails to protect powerless minorities” and that “provisions 
such as incitement to racial and religious hatred are used more frequently to 
criminalize the speech of minorities rather than protect them from hate speech.”83 
Beyond the immediate risk of legislation being used against minority groups, 
hate speech regulation should also be avoided because it is not effective. All hate 
speech regulation limits liberty because it narrows what individuals are able to say. 
Limiting speech based on individual identities and group affiliation is problematic 
because the 2015 European Commission Against Racism determined that counter 
speech is “much more likely” than legal prohibitions “to prove effective in ultimately 
eradicating hate speech and its potential harmful effects.”84 Many European countries 
criminalize hate speech without seeing corresponding gains in social tolerance. The 
Human Rights Watch reports that “there is little connection in practice between 
draconian ‘hate speech’ laws and the lessening of ethnic and racial violence or 
tension.”85 The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights states that hate 
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speech regulation appears to not “have made a meaningful contribution to reducing 
racism or… discriminatory conduct.”86 Countries like the United Kingdom, France, 
and Germany all have explicit laws against hate speech but these laws did not stop 
rises in hate crimes and anti-immigration sentiment against minority communities. In 
2019, the number of hate crimes doubled in England and Wales.87 Hate speech laws 
exist across Europe as homophobic and transphobic hate crimes have been on the 
rise.88 A similar trend has been noticed for anti-Semitism in Europe as well.89 
Therefore, even if hate speech regulation were to be justified in principle, we should 
reject its use in practice due to its ineffectiveness, its threat to individual liberty, and 
its danger to disproportionately harm minority groups. 
 
Section IV: The Democratic Censor 
The final hypocritical censor I will consider anchors its justification for 
censorship in the value of autonomy. In the first part of this chapter I considered and 
rejected a shallow conception of democracy founded on “majority rules” but this is not 
the only conception of democracy. In fact, we should pursue a richer account of 
justified democracy. This kind of democracy is founded in autonomy. The government 
must reflect the will of the people because individuals have autonomy which grants a 
sphere of influence that the government and other individuals are not able to touch. 
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The authority of government actors and fellow citizens in this model are constrained 
by principle. Even if it is agreed that democracies derive its value from autonomy there 
is a divergence on what kind of autonomy the government can justifiably concern itself 
with. I argue here that this difference is generated by a dispute over the importance of 
using coercion to protect positive and negative autonomy. 
The liberal censor that I foreshadowed in chapter 1 is concerned with restricting 
speech when it violates negative autonomy. In short, censorship can be justified when 
speech unjustifiably interferes with the autonomy of others, like in the theater case 
where the intentional speech threatens others with injury and death. Virtually 
everyone agrees that force is justified in repulsing assaults on negative autonomy such 
as attempted theft and murder. However, the democratic censor adopts a more 
capacious concern with autonomy. This censor thinks that speech can also limit the 
positive autonomy of individuals and that limitations on positive autonomy present a 
principled reason to restrict speech. 
Before we go further it will be helpful to elaborate more on the distinction 
between positive and negative autonomy.90 Isaiah Berlin famously made the 
distinction between positive and negative liberty.91 He notes that negative liberty is the 
absence of interference or coercion from others. Negative liberty is “freedom from” 
others while positive liberty is “freedom to” do what one wants.92 These liberties can 
come apart. Imagine an abjectly poor person in a thoroughgoing capitalist society. The 
person may have complete negative liberty with no one interfering or coercing him 
while his poverty completely restricts the life that he wants to live. Berlin notes that 
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the importance of positive liberty comes from the desire for self-mastery where 
individuals are “moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by 
causes which affect me, as it were from outside.”93 But limiting forces from the outside 
can go beyond interference from others. A lack of money can foreclose one’s 
aspirations like coercion can. While every infringement on negative liberty limits one’s 
positive autonomy to at least a certain extent, it is not true that all deprivations of 
positive liberty result in losses of negative liberty. If Sue has her house destroyed by a 
hurricane she loses a significant amount of positive autonomy while still being 
completely “free from” her fellow citizens. 
Having separated the concepts of negative and positive liberty, we must now 
turn to the debate over the role the government should play in realizing these values. 
Remember, most people think the government is justified in protecting the negative 
liberty of individuals. As outlined in chapter 1, the government is justified in 
responding with force when someone wrongly interferes with the actions of others. 
However, some go further than this and claim that government also has the 
responsibility to promote the positive autonomy of individuals. In other words, the role 
of the government is to enhance the freedom of individuals so that they have the 
freedom to do things. For instance, some may argue that government cannot neglect 
those who are trapped in poverty and would otherwise starve in a capitalist system. 
Providing food, money, or other types of welfare are means to improve the positive 
autonomy of that person. There are three different standards that can be adopted that 
the government has the duty to meet for its citizens with respect to positive autonomy. 
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1. No Standard 
a. This position asserts that government has no duty to promote the 
positive autonomy of its citizens. The government only has the duty to 
protect the negative liberty of its citizens. 
2. Threshold Standard 
a. This argument claims that the government does have a duty to promote 
the positive autonomy of its citizens. However, this approach denies that 
government has the responsibility to maximize positive autonomy and 
instead contends that governments only have the duty to raise their 
citizens to a certain threshold of positive autonomy.  
3. Maximization Standard 
a. Proponents of this claim argue that government has the responsibility to 
maximize positive autonomy. In short, in every instance where the 
government is able to promote positive autonomy on balance it has the 
duty to do so. 
Of these three standards, the first and the third will likely strike the reader as 
very implausible. The first standard might be rejected because in some cases we hold 
that individuals have duties to support the positive autonomy of people. Imagine that 
you are walking by a person who is drowning. You have the ability to pause your walk 
and easily save that person’s life.94 The drowning person is not suffering from a lack of 
negative autonomy. To their chagrin, no one is presently interfering with respect to 
how their life is going. The person faces the threat of the water permanently depriving 
them of positive autonomy. If the reader thinks you have a duty to intervene in the 
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situation and save the person from drowning then you reject the first standard for 
individuals and think there are at least some duties of aid for the positive autonomy of 
others. If you are one to think that individuals have no duties of aid to others or that 
individuals do but governments do not then you will reject the positive autonomy 
argument from the start. However, I think that a large share of readers will not take 
this position so I will explore the assumption that individuals and governments have 
at least some duties to promote the positive autonomy of others. 
Having assumed there are at least some positive autonomy duties I will now 
consider the remaining two approaches. The second standard says that you have a 
duty to promote the autonomy of others up to a certain threshold. The person 
drowning in the water may be facing threats to their positive autonomy from drowning 
and not having enough money to pay for their college education. One may say that you 
have a duty of aid up to a particular threshold where an individual is required to pull 
the person out of the water but they are not required to fund their college education. 
Here the implausibility of the maximization standard rears its head. If an individual 
has the duty to maximize autonomy wherever possible then they would have the 
obligation to both save the person from the water and personally fund their college 
education if that would maximize positive autonomy. Most do not think duties of aid 
would extend this far and would stop short at some lower threshold. However, if we 
refer back to Chapter 1, the position that government has the duty to maximize 
positive autonomy wherever possible can be universally adopted and is not 
contradictory. Therefore, I will consider this idealized censor in chapter 3 under the 
name of the Maximal Autonomy Censor. 
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Having laid the foundation for thinking about the different roles individuals and 
governments could take in thinking about their duties about positive aid, we can now 
discuss the implications these standards can have for thinking about speech and 
censorship. Speech can certainly enhance or diminish the positive autonomy of others. 
If governments have duties of promoting positive autonomy then this could imply a 
duty to censor or require certain forms of speech. A basic example concerns 
compliments and criticisms. Complimenting others can improve their self-esteem and 
increase their confidence and performance in projects they want to realize. Similarly, 
harsh criticism can shatter self-esteem and diminish the positive autonomy for 
individuals to accomplish what they want to do. 
If the first standard is right that government has no duty to promote the 
positive autonomy of its citizens then the positive autonomy argument would be 
unable to generate a justification grounded in duty to censor speech. If the maximizing 
autonomy standard is correct then government would have the duty to censor speech 
whenever speech undermines positive autonomy on balance. Likewise, this argument 
would also imply that government has the duty to use coercion to mandate speech to 
maximize the positive autonomy of others.95 Between these extremes, many theorists 
try to thread the needle and argue in favor of government having a duty to promote the 
autonomy of its citizens to a certain level. The hope is to provide a principled 
justification of censorship that would allow government to enhance positive autonomy 
without committing to an implausible moral principle that is illiberal in its application. 
I will first outline this type of positive autonomy argument and then respond that it is 
unable to maintain a principled commitment to speech censorship. 
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I will argue that even if one wants to reject my threshold argument that a 
threshold argument still cannot provide a stable ground for censorship of speech. The 
reason is that individuals and governments can help people reach a positive autonomy 
threshold in a variety of ways that go beyond simply speech. It is not true that 
censoring speech is the only way to promote positive autonomy, even if it is a way. 
Thus, promoting positive autonomy to a certain threshold would be an imperfect duty 
that fails to require certain patterns of speech to be consistently performed. Rationally 
justified censorship according to moral principle, as discussed in Chapter 1, would 
require a principle that is consistent across all rational agents and one that does not 
contradict other moral principles. Coercive laws cannot principally require conduct 
that individuals have imperfect duties to perform. This is because the laws would end 
up using coercion to require conduct that individuals in some cases have no duty to 
adhere to. It is categorically wrong to use coercion to impinge on the autonomy of 
individuals when they do not violate any moral duty. Coercion should be used only as 
a last resort when all other plausible non-coercive options have been exhausted. Thus, 
the threshold positive autonomy justification cannot be extended plausibly on 
principle and should be rejected.  
An influential threshold argument for promoting autonomy through censorship 
is offered by the legal scholar Cass Sunstein. Individuals like Sunstein think the 
government has a role to play in the promotion of positive autonomy. Ultimately, he 
thinks that a society where authority is vested in a democracy full of fully autonomous 
agents is the best one. It is not enough that government simply protects individuals 
from violations of their autonomy. Instead, government should go further and also 
make sure that the capacities of individuals are enhanced so they are better able to 
achieve what they want as fully autonomous agents. Sunstein’s support for positive 
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autonomy focuses on influencing how individuals make choices in order to improve 
their lives. Actors in this view are justified in engaging in interventions for the sake of 
the positive autonomy of the individual. Sunstein links this view up to his view of 
speech in a democratic society. If speech is integral to autonomy then the government 
should be strongly invested in protecting it. Sunstein explains that “The right to free 
speech is hardly in tension with democracy, it is a precondition for it.”96 A robust 
conception of democracy is concerned with autonomous individuals exercising their 
capacities and this cannot done without speech.  
Sunstein also sees drawbacks with complete freedom of speech and sees a 
destabilizing effect such freedom can have on realizing full autonomy. Rae Langton 
agrees with this viewpoint and references the harms to autonomy specifically that 
comes with pornography. Langton argues that certain forms of speech, like 
pornography, carries with it illocutionary authority that in certain context functions as 
an “illocutionary act of subordination” by promoting a narrative of women possessing 
inferior social status.97 This position focuses on the contention that speech can have 
power and that power can be directed negatively against the autonomy of others. Many 
forms of pornography carry messages of social domination that end up silencing or 
marginalizing the voices of women as agents of full and equal standing to men. 
Langton notes that “If pornography subordinates women, then it is not in virtue of its 
content but of its authority that it does so.”98  
Democracies decide through deliberation. The benefit that democracies have 
provided humanity is a mechanism for replacing the making of decisions through force 
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with persuasion and deliberation. The practice of deliberation is important for 
democracies because of its respect for autonomy. The process of true deliberation is 
never coercive and the very act of deliberation focuses parties towards consensual 
agreement that will best promote the positive autonomy for all parties involved. 
Deliberation is where Sunstein focuses on promoting autonomy. He does not support 
widespread government censorship because of its threats to individual autonomy. 
However, Sunstein does take issue with complete freedom of speech because of its 
tendency to degrade democratic discourse.99 One only has to look at social media and 
their Twitter feed to get the sense that the anonymity, vicious back and forth, dunking 
on others, and character attacks may not be furthering the ideal of democratic 
discourse. Sunstein thinks that government has the obligation to protect a necessary 
threshold of democratic discourse so that positive autonomy can be promoted at least 
up to this threshold. Sunstein’s approach is not maximizing and he does not think 
that government should use coercion to maximize positive autonomy for individuals 
across the board. His concern is with achieving a basic standard of deliberation and 
that sometimes complete freedom of expression can pose an obstacle to this goal. 
Sunstein proposes a “New Deal for Speech” that seeks to promote the positive 
autonomy of individuals. In this model, government policy is directed to “reinvigorate 
processes of democratic deliberation, by ensuring greater attention to public issues 
and greater diversity of views.”100 Speech that undermines democratic deliberation 
should be limited to increase the overall level of democratic deliberation to a basic 
standard. This approach would ensure that all individuals have access to a basic level 
of positive autonomy. This proposal draws important comparisons to Franklin 
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Roosevelt’s economic New Deal. This view of government saw unfettered capitalism as 
having failed to protect an adequate amount of positive autonomy to individuals in the 
economic sphere. Accordingly, government implemented policies, like Social Security, 
to raise individuals to a certain threshold of economic freedom. The government did 
not attempt to maximize positive autonomy but instead tried to set and meet a 
threshold standard it believed all individuals were entitled to. Sunstein’s New Deal for 
Free Speech works in the same manner but replaces its concern for economic freedom 
with political freedom relating to democratic deliberation. Even if a political order with 
robust deliberation that promotes positive autonomy is in the interest of everyone that 
does not mean that complete freedom will lead to this outcome. Isaiah Berlin notes 
that there can be a disconnect between what individuals “actually seeks and chooses” 
and in some cases coercing someone for their own good may “be for my benefit; indeed 
it may enlarge the scope of my liberty.101  
Sunstein and Langton believe that democracies should be committed to the 
principle that citizens should be able to decide and deliberate on the actions of 
government in full and equal standing. There are two important clauses in this 
principle and those are the terms full and equal. The second clause says that citizens 
should be held in equal standing. This is an important principle and all citizens 
should be formally equal before the law. However, it is more difficult and dangerous to 
enforce equality of outcomes between citizens when it comes to speech. An equality 
speech censor can only remain consistent by fully committing to the principle of 
equality in a universally coherent manner. In the next chapter I will elaborate on the 
drawbacks of the approach this kind of censor takes. The second important clause is 
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the term “full” when we refer to democracy’s desire to hold people in full standing as 
citizens. Sunstein and Langton focus on this word as it relates to the autonomy of 
individuals. They argue that speech can undermine deliberation and subordinate 
others through the illocutionary authority of certain kinds of speech. Individuals must 
have a requisite amount of autonomy to participate in full standing within a 
democracy. This view proposes that it can sometimes be justified to limit free speech 
in the name of autonomy. If a robust conception of autonomy is the primary value in a 
democratic society then it would be permissible to limit speech to reach a basic 
threshold of positive autonomy for everyone. Speech would be censored in the name of 
speech. Limitations on freedom would be enforced in the name of freedom. 
A major problem with this argument is that promoting positive autonomy 
cannot lead to a principled and categorical justification for censoring speech unless it 
is maximizing. I will argue that if one accepts that there is a duty to help others reach 
a threshold of positive autonomy then it would be an imperfect duty because that 
threshold can be satisfied in a variety of ways. It is not true that censoring speech is 
the only way to promote positive autonomy, even if it is one way. Coercive laws cannot 
principally require conduct that individuals have imperfect duties to perform. This is 
because the laws would end up using coercion to require conduct that individuals in 
some cases have no duty to adhere to. I assume that it is always wrong to coerce 
individuals by limiting their speech when they do not violate any duties they owe to 
others. Coercion should be used as a last resort and should not be exercised if there 
are non-coercive options that reasonably achieve the same outcome.  
If the justification for censoring individuals in the name of reaching a threshold 
of autonomy cannot be extended on principle without contradiction then it should be 
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rejected. I will argue that only two routes avoid such a contradiction in principle. The 
first route is to reject the threshold argument proposed by those like Sunstein. 
Another approach is to resolve the contradiction in favor of a principle that justifies 
censorship in the name of maximizing the autonomy of individuals. This approach 
would resolve the contradiction by arguing that individuals have a duty to maximize 
the positive autonomy of others. I will review this approach in more detail in the next 
chapter in my discussion of the Maximal Autonomy Censor. 
 I have mentioned that there are different ways of interpreting the clause that 
citizens should be “full” members of a democratic society. One way is the maximal 
approach that says that a full members of a democratic society is someone who is as 
autonomous as possible. Another view is that “full” refers to citizens achieving an 
adequate level of positive autonomy to be a full participant. This latter interpretation is 
a threshold approach to positive autonomy and is what I will consider now. Let us 
assume for argument’s sake that this view is correct and that citizens are morally 
entitled to a certain level of positive autonomy when they are a member of a 
democracy. Nevertheless, the positive autonomy of citizens can be elevated or 
undermined in a multitude of fashions. For instance, a person can have their positive 
autonomy enhanced through job offers, money, words of praise that boost self-esteem 
and so on. Positive autonomy can correspondingly be reduced through the revocation 
of job offers, loss of money, or words that harm one’s self-esteem. It is possible to add 
to the short list that I have offered to produce an almost infinite array of actions that 
influence positive autonomy. Thus, while speech does have an impact on positive 
autonomy it is only one factor of many that can support or hinder individuals in 
meeting their autonomy threshold. 
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 If individuals only have to reach an autonomy threshold and if that threshold 
can be reached in various ways then that would at most produce an imperfect duty for 
individuals and government actors. Kant famously made a distinction between perfect 
and imperfect duties. Perfect duties are those that must be performed on every 
occasion. Murder is something that you are always expected not to do and it is a 
perfect duty. In contrast, charity is an imperfect duty because individuals might be 
said to have the duty to be sufficiently charitable without having the obligation to give 
to charity every time they have the chance. Sunstein’s autonomy threshold argument 
is better captured by the second class of duties that requires individuals to meet a 
certain threshold but it does not mandate that individuals do everything required to 
elevate or not diminish the positive autonomy of others. If we accept this though we 
still should not say that it offers a principled justification to censor the speech of 
others. Barbara Herman emphasizes that when agents will they are “committing 
ourselves to will the necessary means, so long as we do not abandon the end.”102 What 
Herman is saying is that it is only required to will the necessary means to meet an end 
and if an end does not require performance on every occasion then it would be an 
imperfect duty. As we have already established, certain kinds of speech are not a 
necessary condition for realizing a threshold of autonomy for others. Therefore, speech 
responsibilities should be considered as imperfect duties. 
There are many routes to satisfying this autonomy threshold duty if it exists so 
no agent should be forcibly committed to a particular mean when there are other 
means available to achieving the same end. As an example, imagine there is an 
imperfect duty of charity. A rich person walks past several street beggars one day 
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without giving them charity. However, in a year the rich person will donate a million 
dollars to an organization that feeds the hungry. It seems correct that the rich person 
plausibly satisfies her charitable obligations even though she does not give to the 
beggars. Now let’s construct the same case but with a threshold duty of autonomy as 
an imperfect duty instead of an imperfect duty of charity. Let’s say that the rich 
person has an obligation to help individuals reach a certain level of autonomy. She is 
not a kind person with her words. She says several hurtful things to some people 
which diminish their positive autonomy, she fails to say things that increase their 
positive autonomy, and she doesn’t really assist others in cultivating their full 
deliberative capacities as democratic citizens. These slighted people are similar to the 
street beggars who are supported by the rich person. However, assume that the rich 
person at the end of the year donates a million dollars to an organization that feeds 
the poor and dramatically improves the positive autonomy of individuals. It is likely 
that the rich person has satisfied her overall imperfect duty to support individuals up 
to a certain level of positive autonomy. If the rich person can satisfy her duties to 
support the positive autonomy of others then it appears that there is no claim the 
government would have on using coercion to force the rich person by law not to 
engage in speech acts that are beneficial or at least not detrimental to the positive 
autonomy of others. 
 At this point one may argue that losses to positive autonomy are special. One 
may think there are not duties to raise the positive autonomy of others but speech 
that diminishes the positive autonomy of autonomy can be restricted. However, this 
argument would run right into the same implication that comes from adopting a 
threshold principle rather than a maximizing one. The adopted principle could be that 
individuals have the obligation to not speak in ways that diminish the positive 
92 
 
autonomy of others below a certain threshold. This threshold argument though 
generates the same type of imperfect duty discussed because individuals could 
diminish a person’s positive autonomy through speech and then correspondingly raise 
it via other means to reach the threshold. The way to escape is to either say that 
individuals do not have a duty to others with respect to their positive autonomy or 
that one may never act in a way that diminishes the positive autonomy of others on 
balance. 
 What has been discussed so far relates to an individual’s moral duties. 
However, the government’s authority to coerce others does not neatly align with 
individual moral duties. For instance, adultery is an immoral act and is a breach of 
one’s moral duty to remain faithful to their spouse. Nevertheless, most readers would 
say that the state lacks legitimate authority to imprison adulterers or use physical 
force to make them remain faithful to their spouse. In chapter 3 I will argue that the 
state only has authority to use coercion in order to protect individuals from violations 
of their negative autonomy rights. Adultery is a harm to the cheated spouse’s positive 
autonomy and severely compromises their well-being. But not all losses to well-being 
are actionable when it comes to state authority. The core problem with Sunstein’s 
argument is that it contends that government force can be permissibly used against 
speech that negatively affects the positive autonomy of others. Accepting a principle 
that coercion can be used to redress harms to positive autonomy would be a stunning 
and dramatic moral principle if it were to be true. To highlight the difficulties with 





The Gay Chef: 
Paul is a gay chef in both senses of the word where he is attracted to men and is a very 
happy chef. He has invested his life in cooking and it embodies one of his deepest 
passions in life. One bad day Paul encounters two different disconcerting types of 
speech. The first instance occurs when on his way to work a random stranger yells 
homophobic slurs at him. He shudders but brushes of the slurs and enters his home.  
When Paul enters his home his husband is waiting for him. His husband tells him that 
he hates his cooking and that Paul is a terrible chef who has no promising chance of 
success in life. Paul’s husband further notifies him that he lied about liking Paul’s 
cooking to preserve his feelings but that he would not do so any longer. 
In terms of losses concerning positive autonomy, Paul would be much more 
negatively affected by the speech of his husband than by the knowledge that a random 
stranger dislikes gay people. For Paul, the homophobic slurs are likely to ruin his 
morning while the speech of his husband is likely to end his career. If we accept the 
principle that the state can use coercion to prevent losses of positive autonomy then 
the state would have a more actionable and keen interest in using coercion against 
Paul’s husband for his “crime” than against the random stranger. If we accept 
Langton’s argument that speech can be regulated due to its capacity in certain forms 
for “illocutionary subordination” then the speech of Paul’s husband would have 
enormous power to subordinate Paul. The reason is because Paul’s husband occupies 
a position of trust which grants his speech more authority than the speech of others. 
What we see from this example is that speech certainly has power and individuals 
hold positions of authority where their speech can harm or fail to elevate the positive 
autonomy of others. Yet, the state should be silent when it comes to the relationship 
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between citizens with respect to positive autonomy. The state can only use coercion 
when the negative autonomy rights of individuals are threatened. Democratic 
principles obligate the government to respect citizens fully and equally when it comes 
to their negative autonomy. The domain of positive autonomy is a realm that lies 
beyond the authority of the state to forcibly intervene. The only way to breach this 
realm of positive autonomy would be to accept a principle that coercion can be 
justified against others in the name of positive autonomy. This principle could be 
consistently maintained but that fully extended principle is not a liberal one. 
I have argued that accepting the coercive principle for positive autonomy would 
be deeply flawed. First, the threshold argument, even if its core assumption about 
coercion and state authority is true, would not be able to justify principled speech 
censorship. This is because autonomy can be elevated or diminished in a variety of 
ways. Speech is not necessarily connected to the overall fate of one’s positive 
autonomy so at most speech would demand an imperfect duty to respect the positive 
autonomy of others. Coercive laws can overlap with strict duties because strict duties 
must always be performed. However, imperfect duties do not always require specific 
actions so censorship could not be used against particular speech acts. The only way 
to do so would be to accept the moral principle that coercion can be justified against 
individuals who do not do anything to violate their duties towards others. Adopting a 
maximal principle, like people have the duty to never do anything that diminishes the 
positive autonomy of others, would avoid this first issue but dive right into another. I 
will discuss my objections to this principle more fully in the next chapter but the 
principle, in brief, is wrong because the state should not have the authority to use 
coercion to enforce losses or gains in positive autonomy.  
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Finally, there is a practical objection to this kind of positive autonomy 
argument offered by Sunstein. He argues that democracies should regulate speech in 
the overall name of democratic deliberation and discourse. However, deliberation is a 
fuzzy and somewhat arbitrary standard that is liable to be hijacked by those in power 
to serve their ends. Would a dissident who loudly and vehemently criticizes the 
government and the status quo in a public park be jailed because he is undermining 
the “deliberative status of his fellow citizens?” Would a rival political party have their 
ability to raise funds curtailed because money would “corrupt the deliberative process 
of democracy?” These questions are raised to show that one’s view of “proper” 
democratic deliberation is a very open question and that it is practically dangerous to 
let government coerce others on the basis of open questions rather than on the basis 
of closed and more clearly defined moral principles. 
Another practical problem is that Sunstein would have government officials 
make determinations about when the state can use coercion to enforce standards of 
democratic deliberation. Sunstein points out that there are shortcomings with how 
people actually engage in democratic deliberation. However, Sunstein’s arguments 
against the ability for people to effectively engage in discourse are the same kinds of 
arguments that can be leveled against public officials. As Christopher Freiman notes, 
public officials are people so if we cannot trust people to make smart deliberative 
choices then we also should be skeptical about trusting public officials to make smart 
decisions coercing people to make smart deliberative choices.103 A further argument is 
required to show that public officials possess an elite skill set to overcome the 
shortcomings that the common folk engage in. Furthermore, even if such elites were 
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shown to exist many governments do not have those elites installed in the right 
positions of authority to properly make decisions. Therefore, Sunstein’s argument is 
flawed because he has not supplied an argument that justifies elitism on the part of 
public officials. Until such an argument is adequately given we should not trust public 
officials to enforce this moral principle just like Sunstein does not trust the people to 
engage in proper democratic deliberation on their own. 
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter surveyed four different types of censors which attempted to offer 
frameworks for censoring speech while still fostering a broadly tolerant liberal 
democracy where people are able to broadly express themselves. These censors agree 
that censorship is justified in cases like the Theater Fire Case where it is necessary to 
preserve the negative autonomy of individuals. These censors also want to carve out 
further exceptions for censorship that will foster liberal values. Nonetheless, in the 
words of Joel Feinberg, these censors are avoiding adopting principles that would 
bring “wholesale and intuitively unwarranted legal interference.”104 As I explained in 
chapter 1, a hypocrite is a person who acts and believes in two simultaneously 
contradictory principles. The failure to resolve contradictory principles is a failure of 
rationality and all censors have duties of rationality to act on the basis of universally 
coherent moral principles. This chapter has worked to show that the four “liberal” 
censors considered in this chapter are hypocritical because they commit to a liberal 
conception of government while also supporting principles of censorship which have 
extraordinarily illiberal implications. I have argued that all four of these censors offer 
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extensionally inadequate principles that hold different forms of speech to different 
standards to preserve the illusion of liberality.  
 All four of the censors in this chapter try to censor speech according to liberal 
intuitions. The cultural relativism censor wants to avoid imperialistically imposing 
values on other cultures so they argue that each culture should be able to determine 
its own speech standards. Accepting the cultural relativist censor would require 
stripping morality of its authority or promoting a kind of “majority rules” democracy 
where majorities get to decide their speech standards. Neither of these options are 
liberal because they would limit the moral resources of minority groups or endanger 
them to unjust majoritarian censorship. Not many people who say things like “Europe 
gets to have their speech standards and we get to have ours” actually want to commit 
to a principle that allows untrammeled majoritarian power. Certain objective moral 
principles are thought to prescribe limits on the authority of governments. 
The Humanitarian Censor attempts to censor speech that is offensive to others. 
They recognize that speech can provoke very negative responses in people and strive to 
protect people from uncomfortable states. However, universalizing a principle of 
offense, even in its modified form, would offer a principle of censorship that would 
allow the subjective perception of offense to function as a reason for censoring the 
speech of others. Additionally, there is no non-arbitrary basis for determining which 
kinds of offense suffered by individuals get to count when it comes to making 
censorship decisions. A way to make The Humanitarian Censor operate according to 
an extensionally adequate moral principle would be to become a Utilitarian Censor 
which makes decisions according to the utility lost or gained across persons from 
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speech. But, as we shall see, the Utilitarian Censor is not a liberal one and accepting 
this position would have far reaching implications for state censorship. 
The third censor is the Hate Speech Censor which argues that certain forms of 
speech threaten the dignity of persons by damaging social assurance. The Hate 
Speech Censor wants to protect people from hate speech. Nonetheless, the definition 
of hate speech is extensionally inadequate. It does not make definitional sense to 
restrict limits on hate speech to only minority groups because this is an arbitrary 
decision and what a minority group is depends on the frame of reference one takes. 
Additionally, minority groups can fluctuate over time. The Hate Speech Censor could 
avoid this issue by adopting a moral principle that uses censorship to equalize social 
standing across persons. This is the Radical Egalitarian Censor which will be 
considered in the next chapter. However, the Radical Egalitarian Censor would not be 
a liberal censor and would require government censorship on a large scale to achieve 
its intended goal. A Hate Speech Censor who wants to protect only certain groups from 
hate speech is hypocritical because it holds groups to different standards which can 
be extended to additional groups and keeping the restrictions where they are is an 
arbitrary moral decision. 
The final censor is the Democratic Censor which seeks to improve liberal 
democracy by censoring speech which erodes democratic discourse or relationships 
that preserve a healthy democracy. This view argues that we should promote a certain 
threshold of positive autonomy for individuals. The problem with this view is that 
positive autonomy can be promoted in a variety of ways beyond speech. Individuals at 
best would have an imperfect duty to promote positive autonomy and speech would 
not be a necessary condition to meet this imperfect duty. It is categorically wrong to 
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coerce people through censorship when it is not necessary to do so and there are other 
reasonably non-coercive ways for doing so. Coercing individuals to meet their 
imperfect duties would be illiberal and this is exactly what the Democratic Censor 
proposes. One could avoid the charge of hypocrisy by arguing that promoting positive 
autonomy is a perfect duty which would mean that speech that diminishes or avoids 
facilitating the positive autonomy of others would violate a duty individuals owe to 
others. This is a Maximal Autonomy Censor but this censor imagines an entirely 
different and intrusive role for government that a liberal society seeks to avoid. Here is 
the breakdown of the hypocritical censors on the left and their corresponding ideal 
and extensionally adequate censors on the right. 
 
The Speech Relativism Censor Majority Rules Democracy 
The Humanitarian Censor The Utilitarian Censor 
The Hate Speech Censor The Radical Egalitarian Censor 
The Democratic Censor The Maximal Autonomy Censor 
 
 While the ideal censors will be discussed in the next chapter, there are several 
important conclusions that have been reached in this chapter. I have argued that it is 
hypocritical and irrational to censor speech on the basis of community standards, 
offense, hate speech, or promoting more effective democratic discourse. None of these 
justifications can serve as a stable moral foundation for censorship. Additionally, 
committing to any extensionally adequate moral principle that allows censorship for 
community standards, offense, hate speech, or democratic discourse would require 
committing to an ultimately illiberal government regime. As established in Chapter 1, 
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aspiring censors have the duty to be rational and avoid hypocrisy. The aim of this 
chapter has been to expose four popular models of “liberal” censorship as being 
hypocritical and illiberal. These censors can resolve the contradiction in their 
principles in two ways. First, they can be liberal and not censor speech according to 
community standards, offense, hate speech, or democratic discourse. Alternatively, 
these censors could censor these kinds of things and commit to various forms of 




Chapter 3: Choices Among Consistent Censors 
Introduction 
In the first chapter I made a distinction between moral theories satisfying 
formal and substantive rational requirements. I argue that all viable moral theories 
must be universal in principle and must be coherent with all other moral principles. 
This is the formal framework of rationality. In effect, this framework demands that 
moral principles are consistent and applied in a way that is non-arbitrary. 
Nonetheless, there are also substantive considerations at play. There are many 
principles that formally succeed while being substantively inadequate. The censors 
considered in this chapter are all consistent and meet the formal standards of 
rationality. The focus of this chapter will be to delve into the substantive implications 
of accepting various moral principles concerning censorship.  
In Chapter 2 I applied the formal structure of rationality to several censorship 
approaches that are hypocritical because they fail to consistently apply moral 
principles in a way that is not arbitrary. All of the censors in chapter 2 market 
themselves as promoting a version of liberalism but consistently committing oneself to 
their vision of censorship would be illiberal. All of the censors in chapter 2 can be 
consistent by deviating from principles of liberalism. This chapter will outline the costs 
one will have to make to practically commit themselves to these various deviations to 
make themselves consistent. Ultimately, I will argue that the only consistent and 
substantively sound theory of censorship that we should accept is the liberal censor. 
All the other censors are committed to principle that if universalized in their 
application would seriously compromise important liberal values and result in a 
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concerning expansion of state power. Here are the consistent censors that will be 
considered in this chapter: 
 The Liberal Censor 
 The Utilitarian Censor 
 The Radical Egalitarian Censor 
 The Maximal Autonomy Censor 
 The Truth Censor 
 
An aim of this chapter will be to show that none of these censors can be jointly 
accepted. Consistently meeting the foundational commitments of these censors puts 
them in an irreconcilable tension with the others. However, the liberal censor, while it 
cannot achieve the complete vision of the other censors, will go the furthest in 
realizing all the best ends and is substantively the most plausible censor. 
 
Section I: The Liberal Censor 
 We have finally arrived to the position of the Liberal Censor. In this section I 
will outline the argument framework the Liberal Censor relies on. I will argue that the 
Liberal Censor is a morally consistent censor and that substantively it is the only 
acceptable principle of censorship. 
The Liberal Censor Principle: 
Censorship is justified only when it is necessary to stop or remedy violations of the 
negative rights of an individual and when there are no other non-coercive methods one 
can reasonably employ. 
 This principle does not accept censorship in the name of utility, equality, 
positive autonomy, or even truth as justifying reasons for censorship. The Liberal 
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Censor roots its justification for censorship in the Kantian duty to respect the agency 
of others. This position is universally coherent because it applies in all circumstances 
where negative rights are violated and prohibits all forms of censorship that do not 
adhere to this principle. The second clause of the statement is added because 
censorship is always coercive and interferes with the autonomy of others. If one can 
stop or remedy rights violations without invasively limiting the autonomy of others 
then that option should be taken so long as it is not an unreasonable approach. 
 It will be helpful now to investigate the source of negative rights for the liberal 
censor because this will clarify the limits of state power that the Liberal Censor 
endorses. Rational actors are special because we have the ability to set ends for 
ourselves that we regard as worthy of our attention. The act of setting ends for oneself 
is an exercise of autonomy or the independent and purposeful self-direction of an 
individual. The source of our autonomy is our rational agency and as a result the 
requirements of rationality set boundaries on the exercise of autonomy. The first 
chapter elaborated why rational agents have a duty to act rationally so I will not repeat 
those arguments here. Acting in a rational manner demands consistent action. It is 
inconsistent for a rational agent to use her autonomy to unjustifiably interfere in the 
autonomy of others because autonomy is the source of the value of the agent’s action 
so infringing on the autonomy of others eviscerates the source of value for the action. 
One cannot simultaneously claim an entitlement to act in a way that destroys the 
source of the entitlement itself.  
The fundamental right to autonomy, or freedom, is derived from the duty all 
rational agents have to respect the source of all value: the independence of rational 
agents to set their ends in a way that is consistent with the independence of all other 
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rational agents. For Kant, “an action is right if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom in 
accordance with a universal law.”105 Therefore, an action violates a right if it fails to 
respect the freedom of others through the violation of a universal law. As Arthur 
Ripstein explains, Kant’s conception of state authority is constrained by the right 
individuals have to be independent, or more simply, to be the master of their own 
affairs.106 He notes that for Kant the “right to independence entitles each person to use 
his or her means to set and pursue his or her own purposes consistent with the 
entitlement of others to do the same.”107 This right of independence or freedom is the 
starting point for all other questions or considerations relating to political authority. 
If individuals have the right to be autonomously independent from others then 
it raises a question of when punishment can be justified. Punishment is focused on 
limiting the actions of others through coercion, and censorship is one form of 
punishment. The state’s authority to punish is constrained by the rights of 
individuals. The state has a duty to be rational and rationality demands that 
punishments be applied in a universally coherent manner. The right individuals have 
to autonomy limits the application of punishment. I argue that the Liberal Censor can 
consistently censor speech that interferes with the agency of others with respect to 
their negative autonomy to be free from unjustifiable interference. Tamar Schapiro 
points out that violating the autonomy of others “amounts to a refusal to reciprocate 
within a scheme of shared thought and action.”108 This scheme of shared thought and 
action is the practice of making the independence of each rational agent consistent 
with the independence of all other rational agents. When someone infringes on the 
                                                          
105 Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy, 13. 
106 Ripstein, 29. 
107 Ripstein, 50. 
108 Schapiro, “Kantian Rigorism and Mitigating Circumstances,” 50. 
105 
 
autonomy of others they remove themselves from a shared system of rational 
cooperation where they are entitled to independence. As Ripstein explains, “whenever 
someone acts in a way contrary to right, others are entitled to constrain the 
wrongdoer’s conduct. Such constraint is not an interference with freedom; it is the 
hindering of a hindrance to freedom.”109 The justification of punishment rests in the 
“victim’s antecedent right to be free.”110 Thus, I conclude that punishment, and by 
implication censorship, is justified to prevent or remedy the unjustified violations of 
autonomy. 
Now we can turn to discuss what kinds of actions constitute unjustified 
violations of autonomy that can warrant censorship. In the first chapter I developed 
the Theater Fire Case where a person intentionally and falsely yells fire to start a 
panic. This is a case where censorship of the individual’s speech would be justified 
because the speech interferes with the independence of others by making them 
vulnerable to death or serious injury. The independence of the individual falsely and 
intentionally yelling fire cannot coexist with the independence of individuals to be free 
from bodily injury in the theater and cannot be rationally willed into universal law.  
I also argue that speech can be censored when it defames the reputation of 
another. Consider the following case: 
The Defamation Case 
Bill is angry at his colleague Bill and they do not have a productive working relationship. 
One day Bill decides to express his anger by writing an email to the entire company that 
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accuses Bob of being a rapist. Bill knows that this claim is false and has no evidence to 
back it up. He sends the email anyways and Bob is subsequently fired. 
 In addition to the Theater Fire Case, this case also highlights another case 
where censorship is justified. Bill’s speech is false and leads to extreme reputational 
damage for Bob. The loss of reputation for Bob strikes directly at his autonomy. The 
reputational loss is an extremely punitive social sanction that is imposed on Bob in a 
way that interferes with his ability to act independently and receive a fair hearing. I 
argue that Bob’s rights were violated by Bill’s defamatory speech. However, defamation 
can be the target of censorship or punishment only when the speech is recklessly 
made without regard for the truth or when it is intentionally false. Individuals have a 
right to their reputation being secured against reckless or intentionally false 
statements but not against statements that damage one’s reputation that do not meet 
this criteria.  
 Speech that wrongly interferes with the property rights of another is another 
domain that can be regulated by censorship. When individuals possess property rights 
they are entitled to limit speech that violates those property rights. Fraud is an 
example of this principle at work. 
The Perjury Case 
Bob is on trial for murder. Bill takes the stand as a witness and says intentionally false 
things. These falsehoods make it more likely that the jury finds Bob guilty 
The perjury case involves speech that can be punished by similar reasoning to the 
defamation case. The court system is designed to provide due process to Bob so that 
he is subjected to fair procedures before being punished. Bill’s perjury distorts the 
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application of the procedures by stating knowing falsehoods so that Bob’s case is less 
likely to be decided on the basis of certain factual considerations. 
The Fraud Case 
Bob is in the market for a new car. He comes up to Bill who is selling his car. Bill tells 
Bob that his car is in safe working condition and has no problems. These are lies and 
Bill is aware of the car having several mechanical issues he does not inform Bob about. 
Bob purchases the car where it later breaks down on the highway. 
 Bob’s rights were also violated in this fraud case because Bill’s speech 
manipulated Bob’s property rights to the car through false information. Fraud reflects 
Bob’s manipulated understanding of a contractual transfer so that he can no longer 
make a consensual decision. Bob’s property claim in the car is based on his consent to 
exchanging money for the car. However, the fraud makes it so that Bob was not able 
to freely consent to the exchange by the false representation of the property. 
The Harassment Case 
Bill is angry at Bob so he begins following him around all day screaming obscenities at 
him. Bob is not able to work as Bill is tapping on the glass outside his door holding up 
signs saying not very kind things. 
 Bob’s rights were violated in the harassment case because Bill infringes on 
Bob’s right to have a workspace free of disruption or intimidation. Bob is entitled to a 
reasonable sphere of control and that includes his workplace. Harassment that 
violates rights interferes with an individual’s sphere of control in a severe and 
pervasive way that undermines an individual’s ability to go about their lives in 
reasonable ways. Bill in this case is not held liable because he said something obscene 
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or offended Bob. Rather, by following Bob and severely and pervasively intruding on 
his work and commute he wrongly breaches an autonomous sphere of control that 
Bob has the right to be left alone in.111 While this is a very rough sketch of harassment 
right claims, it does illustrate that individuals have at least certain rights in some 
contexts to being free from speech based harassment. 
The Nuclear Codes Case 
Bill has discovered the codes for launching several nuclear weapons. He decides to 
share these codes and publish them on the internet. 
Bill’s speech revealing the nuclear codes can be censored because they violate the 
rights of individuals not to be exposed to an unreasonable risk of harm. Exposing 
others to certain degrees of risk violates their rights because individuals as 
independent actors would have their independence compromised by being subjected to 
large degrees of risk. Just as the state can regulate behaviors like drunk driving in a 
crowded neighborhood because of the unreasonable degree of risk to others, the state 
can also censor speech, like releasing nuclear codes, which violates reasonable risk 
thresholds.112 
The Bullhorn Case 
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time determining levels of unreasonable risk and it is not appropriate to wade into this debate here. My main 
point is that certain behaviors are unreasonably risky and exposing others to unreasonable risk violates individual 
rights. I assume that the nuclear codes case is a clear example of such an unreasonable risk. 
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Bill goes outside Bob’s house late at night and begins shouting loud things at Bob with a 
bullhorn and disturbs his sleep. 
This case is another violation of Bob’s rights because Bob is entitled to a certain 
degree of control as an autonomous agent which is infringed upon by the bullhorn in a 
context where Bob has a claim to not be disturbed. Bob’s claim against Bill is that he 
wrongly causes him distress at night. However, it is not sufficient that speech can be 
prohibited merely because it causes distress. Recall in the second chapter why we 
rejected the Offense Censor because having an individual’s subjective experience 
determine what speech is allowed is not acceptable. Therefore, I think that we should 
join Judith Thomson in accepting the Distress Thesis that “We have claims against 
others that they not cause us ‘non-belief-mediated’ distress.”113 The Bullhorn Case 
involves non-belief-mediated distress because the wrong is that Bill is noisy at the 
wrong time and not because his speech causes distress due to the beliefs they 
engender. The Bullhorn Case is a type of assault through sound waves and that is 
what can be regulated. Belief mediated distress is an inadequate standard because all 
sorts of permissible speech can cause distress. For instance, Bill could tell his work 
colleague Bob that he thinks he is lazy and incompetent at his job. This speech could 
cause Bob a lot of distress, perhaps even more distress than in the Bullhorn Case. 
However, a person’s right to be free from interference cannot extend to cover speech 
that causes belief mediated distress because accepting that principle would not create 
a universally coherent standard where the freedoms of all rational agents can coexist. 
 Speech is an important way that individuals can express themselves as 
individuals. I argue that rational agents have the absolute right to speak so long as 
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their speech does not violate the rights of others. One’s right to freedom does not 
include the right to violate the freedom of others. As Ripstein explains, “The right to 
say what you think does not preclude liability for fraud, or injuring another person’s 
reputation, or falsely shouting ‘fire’ in a crowded theater when you know people will be 
trampled, because each of these deprives others of things to which they already had a 
right.”114 In this section I have engaged in a cursory outline of certain kinds of speech 
that can be censored or subjected to legal liability by the Liberal Censor. 
 Incitement which provokes the immediate and foreseeable violations of an 
individual’s bodily or property rights such as in the Theater Fire Case. 
 Defamation which damages a person’s entitlement to having their reputation 
not be destroyed without a fair hearing due to false or reckless speech. 
 Fraud which violates the property rights of individuals to consent to property 
transfers without being subjected to misrepresentations. 
 Harassment which violates the rights of individuals to be free from certain 
kinds of severe and pervasive forms of interference in a sphere of control they 
are entitled to exercise control over. 
 Perjury which violates a person’s entitlement to not be subjected to coercive 
force without a fair hearing and due process. 
 Risky Disclosure which violates the rights of individuals not to be exposed to an 
unreasonable risk of harm such as in the Nuclear Codes Case. 
 Assaultive Speech which violates rights by causing non-belief-mediated distress 
such as in the Bullhorn Case. 
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I do not want to claim that these are the only categories of speech that can be 
censored by the Liberal Censor. However, I do think that these categories are 
reasonably comprehensive. Justifications for speech censorship that are intentionally 
left off of this list are justifications for censorship that are based in appeals to local 
community standards, offense, hate speech, promotion of positive autonomy, utility, 
equality, or truth. None of these standards offer a universally coherent justification for 
censorship that is substantively sound. However, allowing individuals the broad 
freedom to speak has led to enormous gains in social utility, equality, the reduction of 
hate speech, and the pursuit of truth. The Liberal Censor offers a plausible moral 
standard that can promote many things of value while maintaining rational 
consistency. 
 The first chapter was an argument that rational agents are obligated to be 
methodologically rigorous when applying and accepting moral principles. One must 
only apply and accept moral principles which are universally coherent. A moral 
principle is not extensionally adequate if it cannot be applied to all categories of cases 
that fall under the principle. In the second chapter I highlighted four common 
approaches that were “liberal” censors but were hypocritical because they applied 
principles that were not methodologically rigorous and were selectively and arbitrarily 
applied to some speech and not other kinds of speech that would be covered by the 
same principle. As Kant says, a moral obligation only has moral force when it carries 
with it “absolute necessity.”115 A valid moral principle binds rational agents in all cases 
of the principle’s application. The Liberal Censor here is methodologically rigorous and 
grounds the moral principle of censorship in respect for individual autonomy. 
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Censorship is justified only when individuals are wrongly interfered with through 
speech that violates the ability for the equal exercise of liberty under a framework 
accepted by rational agents operating under universally coherent principles. I 
understand that accepting the conclusions reached in this chapter can be unsettling. 
Most people are attracted to promoting utility, equality, positive autonomy, and truth 
and want to prohibit negative things like obscenity and hate speech. However, 
adopting a principle of censorship to advance these aims would be even more 
unsettling if those moral principle are extensionally adequate and not applied in an 
arbitrary or hypocritical manner. Any methodologically rigorous moral principle has to 
bite some bullets because some fundamental values cannot be simultaneously 
achieved. Liberty, utility, equality, and truth cannot all be completely respected at 
once. 
 Before I turn to the remaining sections which outline the problems with 
accepting other consistent principles of censorship, I will close with some final 
thoughts on why we should accept the Liberal Censor. There is something beautiful in 
the realization of autonomy: the ability of independently directing your ends under 
your own authority. Rational agents are not suited to be pawns on a chess board but 
rather are naturally suited to be chess players. Rational agents occupy a position of 
independent authority where they, and they alone, are in a position to determine what 
ends they will pursue so long as it is consistent with the rational ends of others. For 
this reason, Kant is right that we have the obligation to treat individuals as ends in 
themselves and never as a means to our own ends. Treating others as a means is a 
fundamental affront to one’s most basic status as a rational agent. Treating others as 
a means assumes unjustified authority over them. 
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 Speech is perhaps the most central way that an individual is able to set ends 
they have determined for themselves. Humans do not exist as a vacuum within our 
own minds. We are driven by a primal urge to communicate and make the outer 
expression of our identity consistent with our internal identity. Speech is the most 
effective medium for facilitating this transfer of identity and a person who is limited in 
their speech will experience a tension between their outer and internal identities. 
When a rational agent violates the rights of others they willingly open themselves to 
interference to remedy the rights violation and restore the balance of a state of equal 
rational freedom. However, any act of censorship that does not remedy or prevent 
rights violations uses the rational agent as a tool for some other end that they have 
not willingly adopted as their own. Thus, any form of censorship that extends beyond 
upholding the rights of others is a deep and fundamental wrong. If we are to value 
autonomy at all we must accept the liberal model of censorship and reject all other 
forms of censorship. I will now turn to several moral theories that reject the 
fundamental value of autonomy as self-directed agency. 
 
Section II: The Utilitarian Censor 
 In chapter 2 we reviewed the Humanitarian Censor who censors speech in order 
to prevent harm being caused to others. However, the difficulty with this approach was 
that it did not have a metric for evaluating when harms could be permissibly censored. 
Things like offensive speech can bring both benefits and harms. The Utilitarian Censor 
offers a universally coherent approach for censoring speech by holding utility as its 
value and justifying censorship, or refraining from censorship, in the name of the 
promotion of utility. This censor proposes the following moral censorship principle: 
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The Utilitarian Censor Principle: 
Censorship is always morally justifiable when the act promotes more utility on balance 
and is never justifiable when it leads to less utility on balance. 
 While the literature on utilitarianism is vast, I am going to follow the majority of 
scholars and define utility as subjective well-being or happiness, or the pleasure felt 
by the creature directly experiencing it. Utilitarians hold the promotion of utility as the 
paramount moral value and assert that actions are morally right “in proportion to as 
they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of 
happiness.”116 This principle directly connects to an evaluation of the morality of 
censorship: it is right when it tends to promote happiness and wrong when it produces 
unhappiness. Rational agents value happiness and that is why utilitarians are 
inclined to view happiness as the guiding moral principle. This censor is 
methodologically sound because it advances a morally consistent position. The 
promotion of utility is a moral principle that extends across all rational agents. 
Furthermore, the promotion of utility is the highest value so there is no contradiction 
as all other values are subsidiary to this guiding moral principle. 
 What does the utilitarian position imply for government censorship? This is 
unclear because the conclusions the utilitarian reaches depends on the facts on the 
ground based on the actual balance of utility that various forms of speech affect. John 
Stuart Mill offered the most famous defense of individual freedom of speech against 
government censorship on utilitarian grounds. Mill argued that censorship could lead 
to the suppression of truth, the loss of the ability to sharpen and critically analyze 
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one’s own positions, and the loss of individuality within a more conformist society.117 
He thought that utility would be favorably promoted in a society that had very minimal 
censorship. Mill acknowledged that there were human limitations in determining 
which approaches would promote utility on balance with speech issues but while we 
cannot have absolute certainty we can have “assurance sufficient for the purposes of 
human life.”118 The problem with this argument is that it does not provide very secure 
foundations for rejecting widespread censorship on behalf of the state. Mill lived in a 
time where the government lacked the technology it does today to more selectively 
target speech that it wants to censor. Mill’s time also lacked the internet and social 
media where misinformation, insults, and cyberbullying can be instantaneously 
transmitted across audiences of millions. Perhaps Mill today would no longer think 
that he had sufficient assurance to reject censorship according to the Utilitarian 
Censor Principle. The ability for speech to promote or detract from social utility is 
constantly shifting according to the uses of speech and the evolving technology used to 
promote direct the speech. For these reasons we cannot assume that the utilitarian 
position will not reject widespread censorship. It is time to take a closer look at the 
merits of the principle itself. 
 One major problem with the philosophy of utilitarianism is with its attempt to 
make utility a unifying metric across persons. It is very difficult to see how different 
categories of pleasure and pain can be measured against each other according to a 
common currency. One person might stub their toe and another might be called a “vile 
crook” and both of these circumstances cause pain and diminish the welfare of the 
person experiencing it. However, it is absurd to assign common values to these 
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experiences such that a stubbed toe causes -3 utility whereas being called a “vile 
crook” by a random stranger is worth -6 utility and -13 utility if it is said by your 
friend. The human mind simply does not make such calculations in this manner. If 
individuals do not think this way then how can we expect governments, populated by 
individuals, to make such decisions? Moreover, happiness is a subjective experience 
where one person’s happiness or suffering cannot be directly experienced by others. 
The lack of direct experience makes it that much more difficult to make utility a 
unifying currency that can establish clear standards for making a decision. The best 
public officials can do is guess with “sufficient assurance” but such guesses the run 
the risk of granting public officials the ability to make more arbitrary decisions in 
employing censorship across persons that strips individuals of the moral due process 
they should be entitled to. 
 Another major problem of the Utilitarian Censor Principle is that even if utility 
can be appropriately discerned and aggregated across persons it leaves government 
deferring to individuals whose experiences we do not think should have weight in 
moral decision making. Remember that the utilitarian defines utility as subjective 
well-being or happiness. Utility is utility and there are no distinctions made between 
good or bad utility on principle. Bernard Williams aptly critiques utilitarianism 
because it could lead to a racist majority dictating racist policies if they are sufficiently 
numerous and feel subjectively strong enough about discriminating against others on 
the basis of race.119 This argument can be directly applied to speech issues. 
The Racist Society 
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There is an isolated society which is incredibly racist and espouses white supremacist 
ideals. The vast majority of the society gains a lot of utility in censoring, suppressing, 
and subordinating minority groups. Additionally, these people lose a tremendous 
amount of utility on balance when there are suggestions made that the racists are 
wrong or bigoted in their beliefs. A lone person of color lives in the society and one day 
tells the racists that they are wrong and bigoted and that all races should be treated 
equally. The lone person of color gains a very small amount of utility through their 
speech and this gain in utility is vastly outweighed by the loss of utility experienced by 
the racists. 
 In this imagined society, utility is best promoted by censoring the speech of the 
lone person of color and deferring to the large utility gains of the white supremacists. 
Thus, the Utilitarian Censor Principle asserts that there is moral justification for 
censoring the speech of the person of color. This is blatantly wrong and the liberty for 
an individual to speak should not cave to the desires of the racist majority, even if they 
gain more utility on balance. The right to speak cannot be dependent on the raw 
balance of utility because that would offer justifications for societies like the racist 
society to censor speech. 
 Another problem with the Utilitarian Censor Principle is not just aggregated 
groups of individuals can limit the autonomy of others but also that individuals can 
substantially limit the autonomy of large groups of people. Robert Nozick challenges 
utilitarianism by imagining a “utility monster” which gains such a vast amount of 
utility by consuming individuals that the moral principle of utilitarianism would justify 
feeding individuals to the utility monster to create enormous utility gains.120 There can 
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also be utility monsters when it comes to speech issues. In chapter 2 I outlined the 
case of Sue who is the eggshell IRS agent whose self-esteem absolutely shatters when 
she is called a thief by Frank for collecting taxes. Sue is a negative utility monster 
because she loses such an enormous amount of utility from being called a thief that it 
vastly outweighs any utility Frank gains by being able to express his political beliefs. 
The speech utility monster concept can also be applied to justify compelled speech. 
King George 
King George absolutely loves feeling superior to everyone else and when people speak to 
praise him and grovel. In fact, when individuals come before him and say things like “no 
one can match your wisdom,” even if they don’t believe it, King George’s utility 
skyrockets. King George gains so much utility from this groveling that it outweighs the 
losses of utility from individuals who are forcibly compelled to come before him to grovel 
and say false things.  
 King George is also a utility monster of a different sort from Sue. He gains so 
much utility from compelled speech that it overrides the autonomy of individuals when 
the Utilitarian Censorship Principle is applied. Any purported moral principle that 
supports such conclusions in principle is a substantively flawed moral principle and 
should be rejected. Just because a person stands to gain or lose large amounts of 
utility from speech this does not provide a moral justification in itself for censoring or 
compelling the speech of others. The ability for people to speak should be decided on 
grounds apart from utility. 
The Utilitarian Censor Principle should be rejected by any person who accepts 
any of the other censorship principles on a consistent basis. Ultimately, the Utilitarian 
Censorship Principle is hostile to the principled pursuit of autonomy, equality, and 
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truth. The Liberal Censor makes censorship decisions based on individual autonomy 
while the Utilitarian Censor makes these decisions based on the balance of social 
utility. Granting individuals liberal rights to speak will sometimes lead to losses of 
utility on balance. Anyone that thinks that utility considerations should not dictate 
the freedom of individuals should reject the Utilitarian Censor. The promotion of utility 
and equality are also foundationally at odds. There are cases where maximizing utility 
comes at the expense of utility. For example, one action could lead Person A and B to 
have utility gains of 20 and 20 respectively. This would uphold equality. However, 
another action could lead to Person A and B having gains of utility of 250 and 20. This 
second action provides much more utility on balance but creates deep inequality.121 As 
John Rawls spells out “the principle of utility is incompatible with the conception of 
social cooperation among equals for mutual advantage.”122 Finally, the principle of 
utility can also come into tension with the pursuit of truth. It has long been said that 
“ignorance is bliss” and knowledge of what is true can at times make people deeply 
unhappy and degrade their utility. The truly consistent utilitarian has to be willing 
when push comes to shove to suppress the truth and lie when an individual speaks 
the truth and this results in losses of utility on balance. Moreover, Susanna Rinard 
argues that there are sometimes cases where people can believe things without being 
directed on the basis of evidence.123 Utilitarians would recommend in such 
circumstances people should adapt their beliefs, even against the evidence, in order to 
maximize utility. On a basic level of foundational moral commitments, the utilitarian 
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censor cannot be reconciled with the principled commitments of the liberal, equality, 
and truth censors. If one chooses any of the other consistent censors then the 
Utilitarian Censorship Principle must be rejected. 
 A final reason against the Utilitarian Censor that I will mention is that the pure 
pursuit of utility is not a desirable end in itself. Utilitarians assert that utility is the 
core value humans should stake their moral interests in but the challenge of accepting 
this conclusion is reflected in an ingenious thought experiment offered by Derek Parfit. 
The Repugnant Conclusion is a thought experiment developed by Parfit which 
imagines one productive and healthy world on average and a world in misery but with 
an extremely large population. Parfit notes that “For any perfectly equal Population 
with very high positive welfare, there is a population with very low positive welfare 
which is better, other things being equal.”124 To illustrate this issue raised by Parfit in 
more detail let’s turn to the  
Meteor Strike 
There are two worlds. World A has a small population of only several thousand. These 
people are all very happy. They all are able to speak freely and they are autonomous 
agents who pursue their ends with equal respect for the ends of others. World B is a 
state of appalling misery. It is populated by several billion people who have lives barely 
worth living. These people are regularly unhappy and sick, they are censored, they are 
conformists, and utterly lack individuality. However, the small utility of each life barely 
worth living aggregated across billions means that World B has more total utility on 
balance than World A. A meteor is hurtling towards these worlds. You have the ability to 
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direct the meteor so that only one of these worlds is destroyed but you can do nothing 
else. 
 So which world do you save? The choice of which world to save reflects a value 
judgement. It embodies the world you think has more value, because rational agents 
would not leave a world they think has more value to be destroyed. If utility is truly 
the governing moral value then the utilitarian would save World B every time. 
However, if you think that World A should be saved then you are rejecting the 
foundational utilitarian assertion that utility is the foundational and ultimate source 
of value for morality. Robert Nozick aptly highlights the issue with considering utility 
as an end in itself. He imagines an experience machine where we could plug in and 
experience anything that we want.125 The experience machine is a means for achieving 
whatever experiences that we want. However, if you would not want to live your life 
through the experience machine then there has to be something other than utility 
which is of ultimate value. There is something of value to living as an autonomous 
agent in an imperfect and messy world that leads me to reject the experience machine 
along with many others. One may be inclined to reject plugging into the experience 
machine because if one does so then they would no longer be living in an important 
sense. The Buddhists are right that to live is to suffer so to plug into a machine that 
obliterates suffering would be to rob oneself of the chance to live. If one does not want 
to destroy World A or if they do not want to plug into the experience machine then 
they are declaring that there is something more to life and morality than the pursuit of 
utility. If one accepts this then they should reject the Utilitarian Censor Principle on 
substantive grounds. 
                                                          




Section III: The Radical Egalitarian Censor 
The third consistent censor is the Radical Egalitarian Censor. This censor 
believes that censorship should be used when speech undermines the equal respect 
that ought to be accorded to people. Certain kinds of speech can create group based 
harms that are an affront to the identity of historically marginalized groups. Words 
have power and can have disparate impacts on different groups of people. The Radical 
Egalitarian Censor is committed to promoting equality between individuals and groups 
and is willing to censor speech in order to maintain a state of equality of standing 
amongst persons. The view is expressed along the lines of the following principle: 
 
The Egalitarian Censor Principle (ECP) 
It is justified to censor speech or conduct that undermines an individual or group’s 
entitlement to have their dignity be respected and to have their dignity be accorded 
equal standing with others. 
I will argue that the ECP is a valid moral principle when it is applied procedurally to 
respect the rational agency of individuals. I will claim that respecting the rights of 
persons consists in respecting the negative autonomy of individuals so long as they do 
the same. Censorship of speech that does not infringe on the negative autonomy of 
individuals is wrong because it fails to recognize the equal claim of others to negative 
autonomy. This is a type of relational egalitarianism based in procedure: so long as 
you adhere to procedural constraints on speech based on the negative autonomy of 
others you get to say what you want. Thus, the liberal censor is a kind of egalitarian 
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censor when it comes to procedure but not according to outcomes. There are others 
who want to stretch the ideal of relational egalitarianism further to also incorporate 
and enforce the ideal of substantive equality between persons. 
 Relational egalitarianism is the ideal, as articulated by Kasper Lippert-
Rasmussen, that individuals are part of a community where people treat and regard 
others as equal.126 There are different ways in which someone could promote relational 
egalitarianism as it relates to the exercise of autonomy. The first kind of egalitarianism 
concerns itself with procedural equality and argues that every person should have the 
entitlements to exercise their autonomy on equal standing. The second egalitarianism 
emphasizes substantive equality and states that there should be equality of outcomes 
between persons in terms of their autonomy. These two approaches meet the ideal of 
relational egalitarianism but do so in very different ways that can produce very 
different results. To illustrate this consider two ways to run a blackjack game.  
Procedural Equality Approach: 
Every player receives chips and they are granted the autonomy to make whatever 
blackjack bets they want that are consistent with the rules of blackjack. Every player is 
subject to the same blackjack rules and cheating these rules is not tolerated. Some 
players make very risky bets and others make conservative bets. Over time, there are 
large inequalities of chips that emerge between players. 
Substantive Equality Approach: 
Every player receives the same number of chips. Players have their autonomy of playing 
blackjack circumscribed so that they cannot engage in bets that would result in chip 
                                                          
126 Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Relational Egalitarianism: Living as Equals (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge 
University Press, 2018), 16. 
124 
 
inequalities between players. Alternatively, players can engage in different kinds of bets 
but at the end of the game chips are redistributed so that all players have an equal chip 
amount. 
What these examples show is that there are radically different ways of realizing the 
ideal of relational egalitarianism. The procedural equality approach treats and regards 
everyone as equal when it comes to the exercise of autonomy, so long as that exercise 
is consistent with behavior that respects the autonomy of others. Inequalities are 
permitted between people and do not violate the ideal of relational egalitarianism if 
everyone is subject equally to the same procedures. The second approach is very 
different. It focuses on equality of outcomes being central to treating and regarding 
others as equal. It can realize equality of outcomes by either limiting the procedures to 
produce equal results or by taking action after the fact to nullify differences between 
people. 
 The upshot of this discussion is that the Egalitarian Censorship Principle will 
have very different implications if one adopts the procedural equality approach 
compared to the substantive equality approach. There is not a clear way to pick 
between the two approaches because each could be adopted consistently. In this 
section I will be considering and rejecting the second interpretation of the ECP. G.A. 
Cohen argues in favor of relational egalitarianism based in outcomes. Cohen is a 
socialist and thinks that justice requires that members of a community uphold “some 
principle of equality in the distribution of benefits enjoyed and burdens borne by its 
members.”127 His concern is that luck will result in inequalities between persons and 
that is unjust. He proposes to correct such injustices in order to make sure that the 
                                                          




effective freedom of others is not dictated by luck or the decisions of others.128 Cohen 
notes that “a socialist need not apologise for being willing to restrict freedom in order 
to expand it” in the name of equality.129 Kai Nielsen also supports this position by 
claiming that the government should prioritize promoting equality in terms of benefits 
and harms between citizens before the liberty of individuals.130 
 Cohen’s and Nielsen’s arguments can be used to justify censorship of speech. 
There are forms of speech, like hate speech, which target groups and reduce the 
effectual freedom of members of groups. A lot of speech discussed in the hate speech 
section of the last chapter fall under this designation. Speech like “no loathsome 
(insert group identity here) are welcome” serve to limit the effectual freedom of 
members of certain groups by assaulting their self-esteem and diminishing their sense 
of belonging. Cohen’s argument leads to the conclusion that speech that contributes 
to inequality between the effectual freedom of individuals can be regulated in the name 
of equality. A charge that cannot be leveled against Cohen and Nielsen’s arguments is 
the claim of inconsistency. They start with the premise that the state is justified in 
using force to remedy inequalities between groups in terms of effectual freedom. 
Speech can cause disparities in individuals in terms of effectual freedom so censorship 
can be justified in these cases. 
 While Cohen and Nielsen’s arguments cannot be rejected on the basis of 
inconsistency, it should be rejected because it suffers from several substantive defects. 
The first is that censorship is wrong because it is a form of leveling down to reach 
equal outcomes rather than by leveling up. The wrong of leveling down instead of up to 
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reach equality is beautifully captured in the short story of Harrison Bergeron by Kurt 
Vonnegut. In the story, Harrison Bergeron is a talented young boy who is limited by 
the state in the name of enforcing equality. He is forced to wear impediments that 
obscure his physical beauty, weights restrict his physical prowess, and sensors 
damage the expression of his intellectual gifts.131 The society is equal by having 
Harrison Bergeron leveled down to the position of everyone else by coercion. Vonnegut, 
who was a socialist, was making the point that equality can be pursued in a wrong 
way if it is done through leveling down others. Leveling up others to a position of 
equality is always preferable than leveling down. Censorship is coercive so it is always 
a form of leveling down when it is used to promote equality. An egalitarian state 
always should pursue a leveling up strategy to reach equality than a leveling down. 
Individuals and groups may have their equal standing harmed by speech but that 
equal standing can be restored in other ways, such as the government elevating and 
encouraging the voices of historically marginalized groups. If censorship is not 
necessarily required to achieve equality, which it is not, then Cohen’s egalitarian 
argument would not support censoring speech if one accepts the premises that 
leveling up to equality is preferable than leveling down and that leveling up is possible. 
Thus, censorship is not a necessary condition for achieving the Radical Egalitarian 
vision so it should be rejected in favor of other leveling up strategies to equality. 
 Another problem with the Radical Egalitarian Censor is that egalitarianism is 
fundamentally at odds with the state’s ability to censor speech. The radical egalitarian 
argues that all individuals should be treated equally with respect to their effectual 
freedom but then declares that state officials are granted special authority that other 
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citizens are not to coerce people through censorship. The state is, by nature, a 
hierarchical organization that claims a special purview to enforce the laws that 
ordinary citizens cannot. As Tibor Machan notes, “to bring about the requisite equality 
there must be a group of persons quite unequal to everyone else in their power to 
impose their will.”132 Therefore, the state should be considered an organization that 
grants its officials extra effectual freedom to enforce equality. Consequently, a truly 
consistent radical egalitarian cannot promote state authority for censorship because 
that would fail to treat individuals equally and would in fact be promoting inequality 
through the maintenance of a system of hierarchy. If the radical egalitarian tries to 
grant state officials an exception when it comes to equality of effectual freedom then 
the argument would be committed to a contradiction that would relegate itself to the 
status of other hypocritical censors in chapter 2. Thus, a consistent radical egalitarian 
censor would be opposed to state censorship authority on principle. Without state 
authority for censorship where the state holds a monopoly on censorship then an 
anarchic state of affairs is produced where everybody can censor everybody in the 
name of equality. Most people who want to censor in the name of equality would not 
want to commit themselves to this vision of society. I think most readers will join me 
in rejecting this attempted justification for censorship as substantively unsound. 
 Accepting the egalitarian censor would also require rejecting the visions of all 
the other consistent censors. First, censorship in the name of equality violates the 
liberty of individuals by using coercion against them when they have not violated the 
negative autonomy of others. Second, using coercion to promote equality can 
undermine the utilitarian’s desire to maximize utility. For instance, imagine there are 
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two individuals in a society where utility can be quantified. Prior to censorship, person 
A has a 100 utiles and person B has 20 utiles.133 This state of affairs is unequal and 
let us say that person A’s ability to speak freely leads to this disparity in outcomes. 
The Radical Egalitarian censors person A so that both people have 20 utiles and they 
are substantively equal. However, this destroys utility. The world before censorship 
had 120 utiles of censorship and forcibly promoting utility by leveling down led to a 
world with a total utility of 40 utiles.134 This same argument also shows that the 
radical egalitarian can be fundamentally at odds with maximizing autonomy. If you 
take the example above but replace utiles with some measure of autonomy we see that 
promoting equality through censorship can result in a world where positive autonomy 
is destroyed in the name of equality. Thus, the maximal autonomy censor should 
reject the radical egalitarian censor’s vision. Finally, the radical promotion of equality 
can also come at the expense of truth seeking. Individuals can generate inequality by 
speaking the truth because the truth can sometimes hurt or diminish the welfare of 
individuals. If an official can use coercion to limit the liberty of others to speak in the 
name of equality then it also would suggest that suppressing the truth in the name of 
promoting equality would also be permissible for the Radical Egalitarian Censor. 
Therefore, all the other consistent censors, in virtue of their consistency, reject the 
moral principle underlying the claim of the Radical Egalitarian Censor. 
 A final argument against this kind of radical egalitarianism is that substantive 
equality between persons is not a good unconditioned final end. Remember that the 
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Radical Egalitarian Censor is willing to censor speech, limit liberty, destroy utility, 
diminish overall positive autonomy, and suppress the truth in the name of equality so 
it better be a wondrous final end. But that is not the case. If people are equal in terms 
of outcomes then so what? If the reply is that equality makes people feel better or 
reduces resentment then these are arguments for human happiness, not equality, as 
being the final unconditioned end. I have argued that procedural equality between 
persons is valuable because it respects the independent autonomy of rational actors. 
But in this argument respecting procedural equality is a means to ultimately 
respecting the autonomy of rational agents by respecting the equal moral standing of 
rational agents. Equality can be an important means but I think it has zero 
independent value as a final end. Some may disagree and I will be unlikely to convince 
them otherwise because equality for them is final and they are willing to sacrifice 
freedom, welfare, and truth in its name. However, my arguments in this section are 
arguments for why individuals who value other ends should reject the central aim of 
the Radical Egalitarian Censor to regard outcome equality as a final end. One can 
consistently commit to the principle of equality but that commitment would require 
sacrificing things of moral value and produce a more authoritarian world that is 
chillingly reminiscent of the social vision painted in Harrison Bergeron. Some may 
want to bite this bullet for equality but that is a decision I will not make and I hope 
most readers will not make either. 
 
Section IV: The Maximal Autonomy Censor 
 The Maximal Autonomy Censor is a censor who cares deeply about the value of 
autonomy but thinks that the state should interact with the autonomy of individuals 
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in a different way than the Liberal Censor. The Liberal Censor argues that the value of 
autonomy derives sets of rights for individuals which lead to fundamental constraints 
on action. The Liberal Censor views the state’s role as being to protect the rights of 
individuals from unjustified interference. The Maximal Autonomy Censor agrees with 
the Liberal Censor in all of these respects but then goes further and claims that the 
state has a duty to promote the positive autonomy of individuals. Recall that in 
chapter 2 we rejected the threshold view of autonomy because it could not establish a 
threshold of autonomy that should be positively promoted in a non-arbitrary way. The 
Maximal Autonomy Censor avoids this issue by consistently promoting positive 
autonomy. Similar to how the Utilitarian Censor strives to maximize utility in the 
world, the Maximal Autonomy Censor works to maximize positive autonomy. When 
speech serves to diminish positive autonomy on balance this offers clear grounds for 
censorship if one is searching to maximize positive autonomy. A way to structure the 
autonomy censorship principle is as follows: 
The Autonomy Censorship Principle: 
Censorship of speech is justified only when the act of censorship serves to promote more 
autonomous action on balance. 
 A major proponent of this approach to autonomy is articulated by Sarah Conly 
in her book Against Autonomy. In this book Conly argues that paternalistic action 
against individuals is justified when it is necessary to help individuals realize their 
actual values.135 For instance, individuals value their health and want to live healthy 
lives. Smoking destroys the health of an individual so Conly thinks that the state is 
justified in paternalistically interfering with the ability of individuals to smoke in order 
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to help them realize the value which they care more about, their health. Conly 
contends that “Legislation should intervene when people are likely to make decisions 
that seriously and irrevocably interfere with their ability to reach their goals, and 
where legislation can reliably prevent them from making those bad decisions, and 
where legislation is the least costly thing that can reliably prevent them from making 
these bad decisions.”136 This principle can be directly applied to actions involving 
speech. People have fundamental goals and values but sometimes people are unable to 
hold their tongue when it matters and this can destroy the ability to reach their goals. 
Just as smokers reach for another cigarette even when it contravenes the values they 
set for themselves, people are also drawn to speak. Consider: 
The Vindictive Email 
Michael highly values personal relationships like most people. He deeply values the 
intimate relationships that he has with his family, friends, and work colleagues. One 
day Michael has a very bad day. His family was incredibly annoying, his best friend 
was mean to him, and his boss was impatient. Michael was annoyed and decided to 
write an angry email directed at his family, friends, and his boss. The email is very 
hostile, vindictive, and venomous. It will certainly serve to drive away these 
relationships that Michael values permanently. Deep down, Michael knows the 
consequences of his email but chooses to send it anyways. A government censor 
intercepts the email before it is sent. The government censor reads the email and infers 
that the email will compromise the ability for Michael to reach the goals that he 
autonomously set for himself to have close personal relationships. The email is censored 
and never received by Michael’s family and friends. 
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 If people autonomously choose to pursue healthy lives with close personal 
relationships then actions like smoking and vindictive emails can compromise these 
long term values. The Maximal Autonomy Censor supports censorship in cases like 
the case above where censorship is necessary to prevent losses to an individual’s 
autonomously directed ends on balance. Censoring the email is an act of paternalism, 
but theorists like Conly think it is not a bad label at all to be paternalistic: our valuing 
of autonomy writ large should commit ourselves to stopping individuals from 
undermining their own autonomy. The Autonomy Censorship Principle is rationally 
consistent because it says that all cases where an individual’s action results in the 
loss of autonomy or the autonomy of others on balance should be restricted by the 
state. 
 While the Autonomy Censorship Principle is consistent, it should still be 
rejected on substantive grounds. If autonomy is to mean anything valuable at all then 
it must allow the freedom to make mistakes. Smoking and sending vindictive emails 
may compromise our long term values, but our decision to smoke a cigarette or to 
send angry emails are still in themselves autonomous choices and should not be 
restricted by force. If we were to use coercion to prevent people from saying things that 
endanger their most valuable plans and projects in life then we would be limiting 
individuals to just speak on the little things in life. As Robert Jackson once said, 
“Freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a 
mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things 
that touch the heart of the existing order.”137 Decisions to smoke or send nasty emails 
are actions which touch on the heart of the existing order of the projects of our lives. 
                                                          




The realization of these life projects are the culmination of autonomous choices that 
are made along the way. If guardrails are put up so that we are not able to derail our 
life projects then the value of these projects are diminished because we have given 
them less autonomous self-direction along the way. 
 If one is inclined to accept the Autonomy Censorship Principle then that person 
will be committing to a far reaching moral principle that extends beyond issues of 
speech. The principle is that coercion is justified to forcibly prevent individuals from 
compromising their long term values. This would justify paternalism in a host of cases 
in our lives. Smoking, drinking too much soda, eating fatty foods, watching too much 
TV, and speaking ill of our family and friends are all actions that threaten the ability 
for people to realize their long term projects in life. Someone who accepts the 
Autonomy Censorship Principle are committed to leaning into paternalism and using 
force to limit smoking, soda and fat intake, excessive TV watching, and angry 
comments to family members where it is feasible to do so. In fact, Sarah Conly urges 
readers to adopt this paternalistic approach more comprehensively.138 However, if you 
are unwilling to accept such wide reaching state paternalism then you should reject 
the censorship principle for speech that this argument is based on. 
 There is also an extreme practical difficulty in actually realizing the Autonomy 
Censorship Principle. The problem is that individuals are usually the best judges of 
what actions will promote their long term values and projects. The state is unable, yet, 
to peer into the minds of individuals to see how individuals conceive of the values they 
have autonomously given for themselves. Acting paternalistically always limits the 
exercise of autonomy to some extent. If the aim is to promote the exercise of more 
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autonomy on balance then paternalistic actions are always morally risk because they 
threaten the loss of autonomy, and perhaps the loss of more autonomy on balance. An 
added difficulty is that it is unclear whether or not actions done in the present signal 
long term shifts in values. An autonomous agent, to be truly autonomous, must be 
able to change her values over time. For instance, someone may value health at one 
point but over time come to value the pleasure and sociality that comes with smoking 
cigarettes more than the damage it causes to one’s health. The act of smoking may 
threaten the agent’s long term value of health, or reflect an autonomous choice that is 
consistent with a shift in long term values. There is no clear remedy for how a 
paternalistic can plausibly determine which choices damage long term values and 
which signal shifts in values over time. The paternalistic is committed to a kind of 
elitism that says that the censor knows how to direct the life of another toward their 
values better than they do themselves. Such elitism must be justified and shown that 
the accepted elitism can be maintained over time in government. There is the practical 
concern that government paternalism will lead to more losses of autonomy to 
individuals on balance. Such practical concerns are reasons to reject the Autonomy 
Censorship Principle even if one thinks it is a good moral principle. 
 The Maximal Autonomy Censor may want to modify their approach if they are 
worried about paternalism towards individuals. This modified censor may think that 
paternalism is not justified but that the government is morally entitled to defend the 






The Modified Autonomy Censorship Principle: 
Censorship of speech is justified only when the act of censorship serves to protect 
individuals from losses of positive autonomy on balance due to the speech acts of others. 
 This principle expresses the view that the government is entitled to use coercion 
through censorship to maintain the positive autonomy of individuals. This principle 
extends beyond the moral principle endorsed by the Liberal Censor because the 
Liberal Censor is concerned about preventing infringements on the negative autonomy 
of individuals. Adopting such a standard is incredibly problematic because all kinds of 
speech that we ordinarily think individuals are entitled to express can lead to losses of 
positive autonomy. Recall in chapter 2 the case of Paul who is deeply passionate about 
cooking and living life as a chef. If Paul’s husband makes a disparaging remark about 
Paul’s cooking then that statement will do enormous damage to Paul’s positive 
autonomy because he will lose faith in himself and be less able to pursue the long 
term value that he set for himself to be a successful chef. A person who consistently 
advocates for the Modified Autonomy Censorship Principle must be willing to censor 
the speech of the husband to criticize Paul’s cooking when those critical comments 
result in losses to Paul’s positive autonomy on balance.139 But such an approach is 
absurd because Paul should not have a right to shield his self-esteem through forcible 
censorship. 
 There may be obligations that rational agents have to promote the positive 
autonomy of others through charitable giving, time spent volunteering, Good 
Samaritan acts, and refraining from speaking on occasions when it would 
                                                          
139 In this example assume that the losses of positive autonomy to Paul’s husband from being censored are 
outweighed by the losses of positive autonomy that Paul experiences. 
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unnecessarily harm the feelings of others or be rude. However, as it was discussed in 
chapter 2, such obligations should be considered as imperfect duties that do not have 
to be performed on every occasion. The Maximal Autonomy Censor disagrees and 
states holds that positive autonomy must be promoted on a consistent basis. This 
leads to the conclusion that censorship is justified in all occasions when it promotes 
more positive autonomy on balance. Thus, the Maximal Autonomy Censor turns the 
promotion of positive autonomy into a perfect duty that must be performed every time. 
The problem with this approach is that it creates a principle that is too binding and 
too broad. I think that most readers will believe that the state is not morally justified 
in censoring Paul’s husband from criticizing his cooking and pursuing life as a chef. If 
one has this assumption in mind then the Modified Autonomy Censorship Principle is 
substantively lacking because it asserts that censorship is justified in such a case. 
 Respect for autonomy is the fundamental animating value that is accepted and 
promoted by the Liberal Censor. Nonetheless, the Liberal Censor sees only violations 
of the negative autonomy of others relating to the cases considered earlier in this 
chapter as justifying censorship. The Maximal Autonomy Censor goes too far and 
asserts an untenable view that paternalism or a more expansive censorship is 
permissible in the name of promoting positive autonomy so that people are able to 
realize their central values, plans, and projects in life. While such forms of censorship 
can be rationally consistent, I have rejected all forms of censorship in the name of 
positive autonomy as substantively unsound. People that commit to these censorship 
principle are actually committing themselves to a dangerous vision of state authority. 
For example, in Plato’s Republic, an appalling vision of censorship is illustrated where 
Philosopher Kings or Queens are seen as having the duty to censor and limit freedom 
in the name of creating a flourishing society. Plato’s argument is ultimately one where 
137 
 
the freedom of the individual must be constrained so that positive autonomy on the 
whole can be promoted where people can live a flourishing life. For instance, Plato 
says that we must “supervise the storytellers. We’ll select their stories whenever they 
are fine or beautiful and reject them when they aren’t.”140 Plato argues for this 
censorship because he sees it as necessary for cultivating virtue. The virtuous person 
is ultimately the most free or autonomous person in Plato’s eyes. Plato sees censorship 
as a means to promote positive autonomy or virtue and that is why he devotes so 
much time to outlining in unsettling detail how the poets, singers, storytellers, artists, 
and teachers should be censored to avoid leading the masses away from the path of 
virtue.141 Moreover, Plato schemes to have the rulers deceive the people with a story 
about the myth of the metals to manipulate the people in accepting the station that is 
best for them in life and staying in it.142  
Plato might well be right. A state that censors the storytellers, propagates lies, 
and bans the expression of art or music that leads people away from virtue may end 
up leading to a more virtuous society where people have more positive autonomy on 
balance. But the gains to autonomy in this manner would be shadow gains because 
individuals did not have the freedom to completely direct themselves towards the ends 
they want to pursue in life along the way. The problem with the Maximal Autonomy 
Censor is that it is based on moral principles that cannot rule out Plato’s idealized 
society if it truly does promote positive autonomy. The Maximal Autonomy Censor is a 
consistent censor but it offers a nightmare principle that grants the government a 
harrowing amount of control over peoples’ lives. A person may think that it is desirable 
                                                          
140 Plato, Republic, trans. G.M.A. Grube (Hackett Publishing Company, 1992), 53. 
141 Plato, 71–78. 
142 Plato, 91. 
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to violate the autonomy of others to promote autonomy overall. This vision does not 
appeal to me. Individuals must be free to exercise their autonomy so long as they are 
not violating the rights of others. Individuals will make mistakes along the way and 
will make it harder for themselves to realize the life they want in life. However, this 
uneven path is much more preferable than a moral principle that allows censorship in 
the name of positive autonomy. 
Section V: The Truth Censor 
 The last consistent censor that I will consider is the Truth Censor which is the 
censor that is focused on censorship as a means of promoting and preserving the 
truth in the world. When individuals are allowed to speak freely they can spread 
misinformation, tell lies, and distort reality. Truth Censors are committed to the idea 
that governments should be empowered to restrict speech that harms the pursuit of 
truth. Their abiding censorship principle can be expressed as follows: 
The Truth Censorship Principle 
It is justifiable to censor speech when that speech is false or contributes more on 
balance to a false understanding of the world. 
 The Liberal Censor allows censorship for intentional falsehoods in some cases 
where someone says something intentionally false or with reckless disregard for the 
truth that harms the reputation of others. However, the Truth Censor goes beyond 
this standard and also thinks that false statements can be censored even when they 
do not cause reputational damage to individuals. There are people who claim the 
Earth is flat, the Holocaust never occurred, or that humans do not contribute to 
climate change and these people are making false statements. The Truth Censor 
believes that we can censor these kinds of statements simply because they are false 
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and not because they do things like cause offense and contribute to losses of social 
utility. 
 The need to censor truth to more effectively pursue knowledge has been 
defended within the context of university campuses. Sarah Conly argues that because 
people suffer from certain cognitive biases and have limited time on college campuses 
that speech should be censored when it detracts from a university’s mission to pursue 
the truth.143 She explains that “Speech should be banned because some speech is not 
educational: It’s false, obviously false, and too obviously false to serve as a useful 
focus for intellectual criticism.”144 Conly’s point is that some speech, like saying the 
Holocaust never happened, are obviously false statements which waste time and 
contribute to an inaccurate understanding of the world. The Truth Censor chooses to 
expand Conly’s arguments beyond the scope of college campuses to society as a 
whole.145 Speech that is obviously false and contributes to false understandings of the 
world are liable to be censored because they endanger truth in the world. 
 An immediate problem with the Truth Censor is that censorship is a process 
that has perhaps resulted in the most destruction of knowledge and truth in human 
history. Governments used censorship to ban books that challenged religious 
orthodoxy, exercised prior restraint to stop the publication of books they disliked, and 
chilled speech through inquisitions and through executing novel thinkers. 
Government repression of knowledge is highlighted by Galileo’s trial for claiming that 
the Earth revolves around the Sun. John Stuart Mill wrote his famous defense of 
                                                          
143 Sarah Conly, “When Free Speech Is False Speech,” in The Value and Limits of Academic Speech: Philosophical, 
Political, and Legal Perspectives, ed. Donald Downs and Chris W. Surprenant (Routledge, 2018), 299–309. 
144 Conly, 299. 
145 I am arguing that the Truth Censor makes this extensional argument but Conly may not actually support the 
position of the Truth Censor. 
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freedom of expression as a response to concerns that he had with government 
censorship and the excessive imposition of governments over individuals. Mill saw 
censorship as an acute threat to the search for truth. He writes that censorship is 
dangerous because “If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of 
exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the 
clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with 
error.”146 Mill argues that censorship risks silencing the truth and that certain 
problematic arguments can contain valuable portions of truth which should not be 
suppressed. Furthermore, censoring opinions can lead people to be more dogmatic 
because they no longer have to examine and present arguments for why they hold 
certain claims to be true. Mill states that “The fatal tendency of mankind to leave off 
thinking about a thing when it is no longer doubtful, is the cause of half their 
errors.”147 
 A system of free expression where individuals must present their ideas 
persuasively to get them accepted by society as a whole has led to a dramatic increase 
in societal knowledge. Jonathan Rauch documents in his book Kindly Inquisitors how 
the process of liberal science must be safeguarded to protect the cultivation of 
knowledge and truth in society.148 Rauch emphasizes that the process of liberal 
science works because it imposes two binding obligations on society that everyone 
must be allowed “to err and criticize, even obnoxiously, and to submit everybody’s 
beliefs – including our own – to public checking before claiming that they deserve to be 
accepted as knowledge.”149 The Truth Censor assaults both of these obligations of 
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liberal science because these censors prevent individuals from erring by stating 
falsehoods and reject the system of public checking of knowledge. Liberal science 
works because it involves the decentralized clash of ideas but the Truth Censor 
destroys this process of decentralization by empowering certain centralized 
government elites to censor false statements. When false ideas are silenced then the 
scientific process can no longer kick in to refute them or develop more compelling 
approaches to viewing the world. 
 The Truth Censor can take two different approaches. The first approach is to 
side with Mill, Rauch, and the process of liberal science and restrict the government 
from censoring things just because they are false. This decision acknowledges that 
free speech and open inquiry are indispensable to the maintenance of truth and the 
production of knowledge and so it concretely protects freedom of expression. If this 
road is taken then the Truth Censor practically aligns itself with the Liberal Censor 
which also says that a statement being false is not a sufficient reason to censor it. The 
second approach is that the Truth Censor rejects the foundational commitments of 
liberal science and states that government officials should have the authority to censor 
certain statements that they believe are false. If this route is taken then there are 
several practical difficulties that must be surmounted. First, the government must 
demonstrate that the government’s centralized censorship efforts are more effective at 
promoting truth and knowledge than the decentralized liberal scientific system. 
Second, the government must outline how its censors are justified to hold their elite 
status and be capable of consistently discerning fact from fiction to censor speech in a 
way that is in accordance with the Truth Censorship Principle. Both of these 
standards need to be demonstrated before we should feel comfortable with the 
government censoring in the name of truth and these are high argumentative burdens. 
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 Even if these practical objections are solved, we still would not want to accept 
the Truth Censorship Principle on its face. The reason is that truth has no intrinsic 
value. Just because you have grasped a true fact about the world does not mean that 
you have inherently grasped something of value. Suppose that there are currently 
50,532,764, apples in the world at the moment. I have no idea if that is remotely the 
case because the truth of that fact does not personally matter to me. But assume that 
in this moment you have encountered a true fact of the world. So what? If you are an 
apple farmer then the fact of how many apples there are in the world may matter to 
you but that fact would only matter instrumentally in that it would give you a better 
idea of the world’s apple needs. Knowing the truth about certain things is incredibly 
useful because it can help us act more effectively, realize our ends, or improve our 
personal welfare. Nonetheless, there are plenty of facts about the world that have no 
instrumental value. It is not clear why such true facts of the world would suddenly 
have intrinsic value and be worthy ends in themselves. To highlight this issue 
consider: 
The False Preacher 
Jill has a guilty pleasure. She loves saying intentionally false things. To avoid being 
laughed at, once a week she walks deep into the woods where no one can hear her and 
shouts towards the heavens all sort of false statements like 2+2=5 and that the world is 
flat. She is completely alone and no one can hear her and her false statements have 
absolutely no impact on anyone else. One day you are aware that Jill is walking into the 
woods to say false things. You are a committed Truth Censor and think that protecting 
the truth is in itself a justifying reason for censorship. Thus, you decide to use force to 
stop Jill from entering the woods and suppress her ability to say false things. 
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 While Jill is certainly an odd character, it appears like she has not done 
anything that gives you an entitlement to limit her speech by force. Jill’s decision to 
yell falsehoods is an exercise of her freedom and this decision has no negative effects 
other than the small loss of her own time.150 The fact that Jill intentionally says 2+2=5 
does not seem to be a justifying reason to censor her and override the exercise of her 
freedom. Facts do not have inherent value because they are true so there is not an 
inherent reason to warrant censorship. 
 A main argument of this chapter is that all of the consistent censors are 
fundamentally opposed to each other in their foundational commitments. A consistent 
Truth Censor is opposed to view of the Liberal Censor because it is committed to 
censoring people who say false things even when they do not violate the rights of 
others. This is seen in the false preacher case where Jill exercises her freedom to say 
false things in the woods without violating the rights of others. The Liberal Censor 
would not censor Jill but the Truth Censor would. The Truth Censor is also opposed to 
utilitarianism because the truth can be very painful sometimes and lead to losses in 
utility. Suppressing the truth in certain cases would help maximize utility but violate 
the basic commitments of the Truth Censor. Stating falsehoods could also help the 
Radical Egalitarian Censor achieve their aims of promoting equality of outcomes 
between persons. Finally, protecting the truth runs contrary of the aims of the 
Maximal Autonomy Censor to maximize positive autonomy. Recall Plato’s myth of the 
metals where the city’s leaders tell lies to the population so that the citizens are more 
inclined to accept the best position they should be in life.151 Telling the Myth of the 
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Metals would violate the principles the Truth Censor is committed to but could end up 
enhancing the positive autonomy of people overall. Thus, one cannot be a principled 
Truth Censor while also committing to any of the other consistent censors. 
Conclusion 
 The focus of this project has been to critically examine and reflect on the moral 
foundations of various proposed systems of free expression. This systematic analysis 
also includes a framework for evaluating morally justifiable forms of censorship. 
Applying this framework, my central contention has been that the liberal model of 
censorship is the most plausible censorship model. This model says that censorship of 
speech is only morally justified when speech violates the autonomy rights of another. 
Other models of censorship were evaluated and rejected for either being 
methodologically inconsistent or for being morally implausible. This thesis has been 
divided into three sections. The first section looks at the normative grounds of moral 
obligation and the methodological requirements necessary for constructing a valid 
moral principle. The second section then applies these methodological requirements to 
four proposed models of censorship and found that they failed to advance valid moral 
principles. The final section then looks at five models of censorship with valid moral 
principles and draws attention to their substantive implications. 
 The first part of this thesis looked at the source of normativity for why humans 
have moral obligations. I argued that moral obligations flow from the need for rational 
agents to deliberate and make choices in a manner that is intelligible so that their 
agency can be maintained over time. My argument was that 
1. Humans are agents 
2. Agents ought to live intelligible lives 
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3. Rationality is the mechanism by which one’s life and reality becomes intelligible 
4. Therefore, humans ought to be rational 
If moral obligation is grounded in rationality then the structure of our moral 
obligations must align with the structure of rationality. I argued that the structure of 
rationality must be based in universally coherent principles. The first standard of 
universality is that the objective state of intelligible reality must be true for all rational 
agents. The second standard of coherence is that all valid principles must cohere and 
cannot contradict each other. These standards impose a methodological framework on 
any valid moral principle that rational agents have a normative obligation to comply 
with. 
 The duty to be rational implies a duty to avoid hypocrisy. A hypocrite is 
someone whose actions do not cohere because they do not act in a manner that can be 
universalized by applying unequal standards across different rational agents. 
Whenever someone subjects another to sanction on the basis of a universally coherent 
moral principle without subjecting themselves to the same standard then they are 
behaving hypocritically and irrationally. I then applied this framework to evaluate the 
general moral wrong of lying and censorship. Lying and censorship are generally 
wrong because they fail to respect the equal moral standing of others due to the 
application of unequal standards that prioritizes the interests of some over others on 
the basis of rationally incoherent standards. I point out that a system of free and 
truthful communication is of enormous value to the vast majority of rational agents 
because it 
• Allows us to collectively work with others to realize our moral aims 
• Provides us access into the minds of others to assign moral responsibility 
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• Enables individuals to cultivate their autonomy and individual identity 
• Preserves the ability of agents to fulfill their duties to act authentically 
Thus, if rational agents practically commit themselves to the value of communication 
they would be acting irrationally if they engage in actions that subverts this very same 
system of communication.  
 There are cases where there are principled justifications for lying and for 
censoring the speech of others. I argue that the best principled justification for these 
actions rest in committing to the value of autonomy. Any viable system of 
communication should preserve the equal freedom of rational agents in order to be 
universally coherent. Actors who wrongly infringe on the autonomy of another rational 
agent make them liable to being deceived or censored if that is what is necessary to 
protect or redress the violation of autonomy and return the state of affairs to one of 
equal freedom. This argument forms the basis of the liberal censorship model which 
holds that censorship is justified only against individuals who violate the rights 
rational agents have to independence as a sovereign agent. 
 The second section applies the methodological framework of valid moral 
principles to four censorship models that present themselves as types of liberal 
censors. These censors want to allow speech to be broadly expressed and do not want 
to empower the state with an extensive amount of censorship powers. However, these 
censors each claim that the state should be allowed to censor speech that violates 
cultural standards, offensive speech, hate speech, and speech that undermines 
democratic discourse. I went into detail explaining that if these principles were to be 
applied to censor speech in a non-arbitrary way then they would be illiberal principles 
that would allow for the censorship of a lot of behavior and speech that would be 
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protected under a liberal regime. I labeled these censors as hypocritical because they 
hold certain speech to different standards than other speech that are covered under 
the same principle. To resolve the hypocrisy, these censors must either reject the 
illiberal censorship principles they advance or no longer commit to a liberal system of 
free expression. 
 The final section of this thesis looks into the implications of departing from a 
liberal system of free expression. I begin by developing in detail what this system looks 
like. The guiding value of the Liberal Censor is the value of autonomy and this censor 
thinks the only justifying reason for censorship is maintaining the independence of 
rational agents according to a state of equal freedom. The following forms of speech 
violate the rights of individuals by infringing on the sphere of independence people are 
entitled to as rational agents: 
• Incitement which provokes the immediate and foreseeable violations of an 
individual’s bodily or property rights such as Theater Fire Case. 
• Defamation which damages a person’s entitlement to having their reputation 
not be destroyed without a fair hearing due to false or reckless speech. 
• Fraud which violates the property rights of individuals to consent to property 
transfers without being subjected to misrepresentations. 
• Harassment which violates the rights of individuals to be free from certain 
kinds of severe and pervasive forms of interference in a sphere of control they 
are entitled to exercise control over. 
• Perjury which violates a person’s entitlement to not be subjected to coercive 
force without a fair hearing and due process. 
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• Risky Disclosure which violates the rights of individuals not to be exposed to an 
unreasonable risk of harm such as in the Nuclear Codes Case. 
• Assaultive Speech which violates rights by causing non-belief-mediated distress 
such as screaming on a residential street late at night 
I then consider other consistent censors who reject the liberal model of free 
expression. These censors utilize universally coherent moral principles so they are 
immune from methodological objections. Nonetheless, committing to these consistent 
censors has extreme substantive and practical implications. I argue that the 
Utilitarian, Radical Egalitarian, Maximal Autonomy, and Truth Censors are all not 
plausible censors because they commit themselves to governing moral values which 
are not inherently good values to commit to. Moreover, it is very dangerous to allow 
governments comprised of fallible state officials to censor along the lines of these 
principles because of the danger of improper censorship which ends up undermining 
the source of the principle itself. I also argued that these consistent censors cannot be 
simultaneously committed to because their foundational values are in irreconcilable 
tension. 
 These arguments have several important implications for leadership. Leaders 
are ultimately rational agents so they will have the same binding moral obligations 
grounded in rationality as everyone else. Leaders do not get to be an exception from 
the requirements that they act rationally in ways that are universally coherent. Thus, 
leaders are not morally entitled to act hypocritically. Rational considerations impose 
constraints on the moral permissibility of the coercive actions leaders can engage in. 
Institutional officials will be in positions to shape and enforce the law. They have the 
responsibility to do so in a consistent manner. They should also act consistently in a 
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way that is plausible and when their aims will not be practically counterproductive. 
This framework implies that leaders should only censor speech according to the liberal 
censor model. If the foregoing arguments are successful then leaders should not 
justify censorship of speech for cultural standards, offense, hate speech, effective civic 
discourse, utility, equality, human flourishing, or truth.  
Being moral may at times be unsettling or inconvenient. It may challenge our deepest 
impulses and demand more of us than we want to give. However, the demand to be 
moral is a responsibility that never leaves us. It is something that is always the right 
thing to do. As rational agents we live a life of dignity when we act rationally and when 
we pursue this moral path. As Ronald Dworkin once said, “Without dignity our lives 
are only blinks of duration. But if we manage to lead a good life well, we create 
something more. We write a subscript to our mortality. We make our lives tiny 
diamonds in the cosmic sands.”152 We should never stop speaking as we write out this 
dignified subscript to our lives and we must defend the freedom of others to follow this 
same path. 
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